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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzed costs and benefits between the recruiting of active duty 
dentists and the proposed alternative of contracting them instead.  Despite aggressive 
efforts to improve Dental Corps recruitment and retention, the annual loss rate has 
steadily increased.  This has forced the Dental Corps into using alternative programs such 
as the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and the Financial Assistance 
Program (FAP) in addition to the accession programs already being funded.  Also, there 
are various recruiting costs along with the accession bonus that costs the Navy over 
$90,000 per dentist recruited.  The scope of this thesis included, but was not be limited 
to: (1) a review of the current structure of pay for active duty Endodontists by referencing 
Additional Special Pay (ASP), Variable Special Pay (VSP), Dental Officer Multiyear 
Retention Bonus (DOMRB) and the Board Certification Pay (BCP) that dentists receive 
while serving on active duty (2) and a summary of private sector pay and incentives for 
dentists in private practice.  The thesis also analyzed the differences between the two 
with a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) model.  The completed research found savings in 
cost for contracting already licensed and trained Endodontists in place of recruiting a 
general dentist and training them to become an Endodontist over the 10 year period as 
composed in the analysis.  In addition, a steady-state model verified the CBA and showed 
savings in cost per year as well.  Each model shows significant savings when contracting 
Endodontists in our shore based MTFs.  Furthermore, to mitigate shortages, this research 
proposes to concentrate resources on military essential competencies and contracting 
workload for non-military essential functions, such as Endodontists.  Note that 
Endodontists were chosen because they are one of the larger non-essential specialties 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States Navy Dental Corps is having difficulty recruiting dentists and 
retaining the junior and mid-grade Dental Corps Officers.  Despite aggressive efforts to 
improve Dental Corps recruitment and retention, the annual loss rate has increased from 
8.3% in 2003 to 12.9% for 2005.  In addition, the declining officer retention rates have 
negatively impacted applications for residency training programs, which have dropped 
18% over the last five years.  The Navy relies heavily on this group of officers to fill 
operational billets at sea and in support of the United States Marine Corps. 
The factors indicated above have forced the Dental Corps into using alternative 
programs such as the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and the Financial 
Assistance Program (FAP).  The programs above cost the Navy 10 million dollars a year, 
but necessary in order to try and attract dentists into the Navy.  However, the contract 
alternative that is proposed in this thesis should be considered as another source for 
acquiring already trained dentists.   
The scope of this thesis included, but was not be limited to: (1) a review of the 
current structure of pay for active duty Endodontists by referencing Additional Special 
Pay (ASP), Variable Special Pay (VSP), Dental Officer Multiyear Retention Bonus 
(DOMRB) and the Board Certification Pay (BCP) that dentists receive while serving on 
active duty (2) and a summary of private sector pay and incentives for dentists in private 
practice.  The thesis also analyzed the differences between the two with a Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) model. 
The completed research found a $223,143 savings in cost for contracting a 
licensed Endodontist in place of recruiting a general dentist and training them to become 
an Endodontist over the 10 year period as composed in the analysis.  Furthermore, to 
mitigate shortages, this research proposes to concentrate resources on military essential 
competencies and contracting workload for non-military essential functions, such as 
Endodontists.  Endodontists were chosen because they are one of the larger non-essential 


























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Today, the United States Navy Dental Corps is having difficulty retaining junior 
and mid-grade Dental Corps Officers.  These are the same officers the Navy needs to fill 
seats for the In-Service and Out-Service residency programs used to train general dentists 
as specialists for the Navy’s future.  Many Dental Officers are not remaining on active 
duty beyond their initial obligation due to both economic and Navy-specific reasons.  
Additionally, the Navy has failed to meet recruitment goals and needs to use alternative 
methods in order to continue and attract uniformed dentists into the Navy.  The 
alternative methods usually involve monetary incentives. 
Past research has identified key influences on the retention of junior Navy Dental 
Officers beyond their initial obligation.  Results indicated that accession source, dental 
specialty (other than general dentistry) and the number of operational tours as a 
percentage of total tours an officer completes during his or her initial obligation period 
are significant factors for retention.1   
At the close of FY2003, the Navy Dental Corps was manned at 91 percent.  
Despite aggressive efforts to improve Dental Corps recruitment and retention, the annual 
loss rate between FY2003 and FY2005 increased from 8.3 percent to 12.9 percent2.  In 
addition, declining junior officer retention rates has negatively impacted applications for 
residency training programs, which have dropped 18 percent over the last five years.  The 
civilian-military pay gap and the high debt load of our junior officers are the primary 
reasons given by Dental Corps officers leaving the Navy.3  
The results indicated above have forced the Dental Corps into using alternative 
programs such as the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and the Financial 
                                                 
1 Alan B. Christian, (2004). MBA Professional Report: Influences on the Retention of Residency-
Trained and Non-Residency Trained Navy Dental Corps Officers. Retrieved 13 October 2005 from Naval 
Postgraduate School Library Web site: 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/6RX0aVYDrY/SIRSI/275890064/123 
2 LCDR Kurt Houser, Medical Service Corps, United States Navy, Dental Corps Officer Community 
Manager, Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM).  Information given via email in January 2006.  
3 Former Surgeon General of the Navy, “Defense Subcommittee Hearing on Medical Programs 
Testimony,” 2004, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220818/ [28 April 2004]. 
2 
Assistance Program (FAP).  The programs above cost the Navy 10 million dollars a 
year4, but necessary in order to attract dentists into the Navy.  However, the contract 
alternative should be considered as a possible source for acquiring already trained and 
specialized dentists as well.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study outsourcing shore-based billets for dental 
specialty needs that are not considered military essential.  The primary research question 
is the following:  Should Navy Medicine continue to fund the Base Case (maintaining 
non-essential active duty billets) or use those funds toward an alternative of outsourcing 
non-essential dental specialties using the factors mentioned in this proposal and any 
others derived from my research?   
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study analyzed whether the Dental Corps should continue to recruit general 
dentists for the purpose of retaining them beyond their initial obligation in order to train 
them in various specialties.  This analysis also evaluated the differences of costs and 
benefits between the Base Case and the alternative proposal.  The alternative is to hire 
civilian contract workers that are already trained, licensed and presently practicing within 
a given specialty.  This research involved a step-by-step process for the Dental Corps to 
do a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of their specialties.  The analysis used this process 
specifically with Endodontists, a non-essential specialty with billet inventories above the 
Operational Support Algorithm (OSA), thus making them an obvious target for potential 
outsourcing right now.  I also researched current costs involved with recruiting and 
training a uniformed general dentist to become a practicing and licensed Endodontist and 
compare that to the cost of contracting out for a practicing and licensed civilian 
Endodontist over a period of time.  This project will be both a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis based upon current data to assess the most effective and efficient way for the 
Navy Dental Corps to obtain endodontic services. 
 
                                                 
4 LT Rodney Wilson, Dental Programs Coordinator, Naval Education and Training Command 
(NMETC). 
3 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this study can provide Navy Medicine with a useful framework for 
understanding the benefits of outsourcing non-essential shore billets for the Dental Corps.  
Currently, uniformed Endodontists are needed to treat existing dental needs of our Sailors 
and Marines, and to fulfill existing readiness policies.  This was compared to contracting 
an already trained and licensed civilian Endodontist and weighing the benefits of the two.  
The goal was to evaluate the existing system using analyses to determine the feasibility of 
continuing to train active duty general dentists as Endodontists.  
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The following chapters study the potential benefit of outsourcing Endodontists 
specifically, but could be used for other dental specialists in non-essential shore billets as 
well.  Chapter II highlights relevant information of the Navy Dental Corps.  The intent is 
to provide the reader with a working knowledge of their history, accession sources, pay 
structure and life cycle costs.  Chapter III enlightens the reader with a policy perspective 
and history on outsourcing.  Chapter IV reveals an extensive literature review focusing on 
outsourcing tools and the theoretical foundations that they are founded upon.  Chapter V 
presents the foundation of the Business Case Analysis (BCA) model and methodology 
that was used to conclude with the results of the findings.  Chapter VI discusses the 
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5 
II. DENTAL CORPS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Although one of the youngest of the Navy Medicine Corps, the United States 
Dental Corps can trace its roots back to 1873.5  Prior to establishing the Dental Corps, 
dental services were performed by civilian dentists ashore (making them our earliest form 
of outsourcing) while Corpsman or Medical Officers performed those duties at sea.  In 
1912, Congress officially authorized establishing the modern Dental Corps.  Within one 
year, the Navy Surgeon General was able to report to the Secretary of the Navy that 
recruitment was directly improved due to the establishment of the Dental Corps.  Navy 
dentists were able to treat conditions that only a year prior would have rendered a recruit 
unfit for active duty.6 
Today, the Dental Corps continues this tradition by ensuring military readiness of 
today’s Sailors and Marines by proudly serving on Naval Ships and with Marine 
Expeditionary Units.  These officers now perform many critical support functions for the 
medical community, serving as Triage Officers and Surgical Support Officers on medical 
platforms.7 
The United States Navy Dental Corps is one of five Corps within the Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery.  The Chief of the Dental Corps serves as the Assistant Chief for 
Dentistry for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (M09B DC) and reports to the Deputy 
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.8  As a Rear Admiral, she is responsible for 
dental readiness of the fleet and Marine Corps, planning and operations, material and 
facilities and healthcare analysis.9  The Dental Corps headquarters is located in 
Washington, DC at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.     
                                                 
5 “90 Years Marching Forward.” Lkd. Dental Corps History at “Naval Medicine Online Homepage.” 
http://navalmedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=about&selmod=7AF79F11-2A5E-780B-




8 Navy Department, Manual of the Medical Department, NAVMED P-117 (Washington, DC: 1996), 
Chapter 6, 5. 
9 Ibid, 3-6. 
6 
B. OFFICER ACCESSION PROGRAMS 
The Dental Corps faces increasing competition from the civilian sector.  Stable 
civilian market conditions combined with the promise of higher civilian salaries without 
the commitment of active duty service lure potential candidates away from 
commissioning programs or cause them to resign their commission upon completion of 
their initial service obligation.  Many future dentists can participate in numerous 
commissioning programs to obtain their Navy education.  These programs are specified 
by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N132).  The definitions of these 
programs are taken directly from the OPNAV Instruction (OPNAVINST 1110.1) and are 
listed below:10   
• Direct Commission:  Recruiting a Dentist directly from a civilian 
environment. 
• Recall to Active Duty:  The voluntary return of a Commissioned Officer 
from reserve status to active duty. 
• Inter-Service Transfer:  The transfer of a Commissioned Officer serving 
on active duty, between uniformed services, or the transfer of 
Commissioned Officers not on active duty, between reserve components 
of the uniformed services. 
• Health Service Collegiate Program (HSCP):  Two-year scholarship 
program in designated health professions to complete degree/certification 
requirements and obtain Reserve officer commission in the active duty 
component of the Dental Corps upon graduation. 
• Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP):  
Scholarship program for attendance at the Uniformed Service University 
of the Health Science (USUHS).  This program requires a minimum two-
year payback and six months of service for each additional six months of 
education. 
                                                 
10 Navy Department, Administration of Health Professional Accession Programs (HPAP), 
OPNAVINST 1110.1 (Washington DC: 2001), 2-3. 
7 
• Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP):  An Inactive Ready 
Reserve Program for students accepted to, or enrolled in an accredited 
training program leading to a health profession degree.  This program also 
allows HPSP graduates to obtain graduate professional education at 
accredited civilian institutions. 
• Financial Assistance Program (FAP):  An Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR) 
Program for Dentists currently accepted to, or enrolled in an accredited 
residency or fellowship program progressing toward a specialty, which has 
been designated as critical to the Department of Defense (DoD). 
• Health Professions Loan Repayment Program (HPLRP):  An active duty 
and Reserve program used to recruit qualified health professional in 
specific specialties.  Under the HPLRP, the Navy repays all or a portion of 
the participants’ incurred educational loan obligations. 
Individuals who participate in a Navy sponsored dental scholarship program, 
(including AFHPSP, HPSP, HSCP and FAP), are commissioned as Ensigns in the 
Reserves while enrolled in a civilian dental school.  These individuals retain this rank and 
salary corresponding to their pay grade while functioning as a “prospective Dental Corps 
Officer.”11  While in dental school under a Health Profession Scholarship Program, these 
individuals receive monthly stipends, full tuition and reimbursement for books and 
associated expenses.  The total service obligation is three years for individuals accepting 
any of the above accession programs in which the U.S. Navy funds or provides a 
“program of professional study in dentistry leading to a Doctor of Dental Surgery (DDS) 
or Doctor of Dental Medicine (DMD).”12 
 
C. PAY STRUCTURE 
Although not directly addressed in this study, Dental Corps Officers’ 
compensation has long been suggested as a significant contributor to poor retention for 
                                                 
11 Navy Department, Appointment of Regular and Reserve Officers in the Dental Corps of the U.S. 
Navy, SECNAVINST 1120.13A, Enclosure 1 (Washington, DC:1988) 1. 
12 Ibid. 
8 
junior and mid-grade Officers.13   Numerous studies have investigated differences in the 
compensation of military healthcare professionals and their civilian counterparts.  
Findings reveal that for both military Physicians and Dentists, there are pay gaps between 
military providers and their civilian counterparts throughout their careers (Figure 1).14  
These pay gaps are considered a leading contributor to poor officer retention and analyses 
showed that the uniformed-civilian pay gap existed at every career juncture and that this 
pay gap was greater for Specialists than for General Dentists.15 
 
Figure 1.   Comparison of Navy Dental Officers Compensation v. Private-Sector 
Dentists in 2000 
 
To alleviate this pay gap and associated perceptions, numerous pay incentive 
programs have been instituted to decrease that pay gap.  Dentists in today’s Navy receive 
multiple incentives with varying levels of compensation based on years of service, 
specialty and contractual commitment to the Navy.  The specialty pays and bonuses 
                                                 
13 Shayne Brannman, et al., Center for Naval Analyses, Life-Cycle Costs of Uniform Health 
Professions; Phase II: The Impact of Constraints and Policies on the Optimal-Mix-of Accession Model, 
CRM D0007887.A2/Final, (Alexandria, Virginia: 2003), 132, 133.  
14 Shayne Brannman, et al., Center for Naval Analyses, Health Professions’ Retention-Accession 
Incentives Study Reported to Congress, CRM D0003360.A1, (Alexandria, Virginia: 2001), 35, 73. 
15 Ibid. 
9 
include Variable Special Pay (VSP), Additional Special Pay (ASP), Board Certification 
Pay (BCP), Dental Officer Multiyear Retention Bonus (DOMRB) and a one time Critical 
Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) all in addition to their base pay.  Furthermore, new 
accessions who agree to serve on active duty and did not receive DoD financial aid, or 
were not participants in the Armed Forces Health Profession Scholarship Program 
(AFHPSP) and Financial Assistance Program (FAP) to pay for dental school, are eligible 
for an accession bonus for joining the Navy.16  The currently approved categories of 
special pay and their explanations are: 
1.  Variable Special Pay (VSP):  VSP is an annual entitlement for DC Officers on 
active duty who will serve for at least one year (unless otherwise qualifying under 
specific provisions outlined in the Chapter Six of the DoD Financial Management 
Regulations).  VSP is disbursed monthly, with the amount based on years of service and 
completion of an initial residency program (Table 1).17  This entitlement does not have a 











                                                 
16 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures-
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington DC: 2002), 3. 
17 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures-
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington DC: 2002), 7-8. 
18David Taylor, Center for Naval Analyses, Comparison of Civilian and Navy Pay for Dentists, CRM 
91-20, (Alexandria, Virginia: 1991), 4.  
10 
Table 1.   Dental Corps Variable Special Pay 
Variable Special Pay (VSP) 
Years Service                                                                     Special Pay Amount (Dollars) 
< 3*                                                                                       3,000 
3 to < 6**                                                                              7,000 
6 to < 8                                                                                  7,000 
8 to < 12                                                                              12,000 
12 to < 14                                                                            10,000 
14 to < 18                                                                              9,000 
18 & Greater                                                                         8,000 
O-6 & Above                                                                        7,000 
* If undergoing Internship Training 
** Not undergoing Internship Training 
After Ref: BUMED FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan 
 
2.  Additional Special Pay (ASP):  ASP is an annual disbursed entitlement.  DC 
Officers who are entitled for VSP are eligible for ASP as well as long as they are “not 
undergoing dental internship, fellowship or initial dental residency training, and possess a 
current, valid unrestricted license or approved waiver.”19  Additionally, a written 
agreement to remain on active duty for no less than one year is required.20  ASP will only 
be disbursed once the agreement is completed and will begin on the contract’s execution 





                                                 
19 Navy Department, “FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
Special Pay Page, 2003, https://bumed.med.navy.mil/M1/SpecialPay.html/ [25 October 2005], 1-2. 
20 Ibid, 1-2. 
21 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures-
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington DC: 2002), 7-8. 
11 
Table 2.   Dental Corps Additional Special Pay 
Additional Special Pay (ASP) 
Years Service                                                                     Special Pay Amount (Dollars) 
< 3                                                                                       4,000 
3 to < 10                                                                              6,000 
10 & Greater                                                                      15,000     
After Ref: BUMED FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan 
 
3.  Board Certification Pay (BCP):  BCP is also an annual entitlement disbursed 
monthly to eligible active duty Dental Officers.  Dental Officers are eligible for BCP if 
they are entitled to VSP and are board certified.22  Board certification consists of being 
“certified by an American Dental Specialty Examining Board recognized by the 
American Dental Association (ADA) or [being] awarded a Board Certification 
Equivalency Certificate by the Department of Defense (DoD).”23  As with other special 
pays, BCP is based on years of creditable service (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.   Dental Corps Board Certification Pay 
Board Certification Pay (BCP) 
Years Service                                                                     Special Pay Amount (Dollars)     
< 10                                                                                     2,500 
10 to < 12                                                                            3,500 
12 to < 14                                                                            4,000 
14 to < 18                                                                            5,000 
18 & Greater                                                                        6,000 
After Ref: BUMED FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan 
 
4.  Dental Officer Multiyear Retention Bonus (DOMRB):  DOMRB is an annual 
special pay based on an Officer’s clinical specialty area and agreement to extend his or 






                                                 
22 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures-
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington DC: 2002), 7-8. 
23 Ibid, 6. 
12 
Table 4.   Dental Corps Dental Officers Multiyear Retention Bonus 
Dental Officer Multiyear Retention Bonus (DOMRB) Rates 
Length of Agreement by                         4-Year             3-Year              2-Year  
             Specialty                                  Agreement      Agreement       Agreement 
                                                     (Dollars)          (Dollars)           (Dollars) 
Oral-Maxillofacial Surgeons                   20,000              10,000               8,000 
Comprehensive/Operative                       14,000              10,000               8,000 
Dentistry                  14,000              10,000               8,000 
Endodontics                                             14,000              10,000               8,000 
Orthodontics                                            14,000              10,000               8,000 
Oral Pathology/Oral Diagnosis/               14,000              10,000               8,000 
Oral Medicine                                          14,000              10,000               8,000 
Pediatric Dentistry                                   14,000              10,000               8,000 
Periodontics                                             14,000              10,000               8,000 
Prosthodontics                                         14,000              10,000               8,000 
Public Health Dentistry                           14,000              10,000               8,000 
Temporomandibular Dysfunction           14,000              10,000               8,000 
(TMD)                                                     14,000               10,000               8,000 
Dental Research                                      12,000                 8,000               6,000 
Exodontia (Advanced Clinical                12,000                 8,000               6,000 
Practice – ACP)                                       12,000                8,000               6,000 
Endodontics (ACP)                                 12,000                 8,000               6,000 
General Dentistry (ACP)                         12,000                8,000               6,000 
Periodontics (ACP)                                 12,000                 8,000               6,000 
Prosthodontics (ACP)                             12,000                 8,000               6,000 
After Ref: BUMED FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan 
 
To be eligible for DOMRB, Dental Officers with a current license with no 
restriction (unless practicing with a waiver) and below the rank of Rear Admiral (O-7) 
must “execute a written agreement to remain on active duty”24 for a period no less than 
two years to a maximum of four years.  Additionally, Dental Officers must have 
“completed [their] initial residency training”25 program or have “at least eight years of 
creditable service or have completed their active duty obligated service commitment as 
part of their payback for Navy or DoD-funded education and training.   
                                                 
24 Navy Department, “FY04 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
Special Pay Page, 2003, https://bumed.med.navy.mil/M1/SpecialPay.html/ [25 October 2005], 2-4. 
25 Ibid, 2-4. 
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5.  Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB):  In Fiscal Year 2002, the DoD 
initiated the CSRB as an incentive to retain military healthcare officers possessing certain 
identified critical skills undermanned or essential to meeting the Navy’s medical mission.  
Unfortunately, due to funding issues, this initiative was not implemented in FY02.26  
However, Dental Officers who elected to participate in the CSRB in FY03 and executed 
agreements did receive the one-time bonus of $10,000.00.27 
Although Navy Dentists have numerous special pay incentives, the pay gap 
between military Dentists and private-sector Dentists continues to increase.28  
Furthermore, with new graduates and new Dental Officers facing larger dental school 
education debt, these potential career officers “are choosing to work in private 
practice.”29  Finally, “the December 2000 Journal of the American Dental Association 
report[ed], that the number of Dentists retiring will grow faster than the number of dental 
school graduates.”30  This trend is expected to continue over the next 20 years.  Thus, 
predicting to lower the future price of dental practices being sold and making private 
practice more affordable and attractive to both current and potential future Navy Dental 
Officers.31 
 
D. PAY GAPS 
A pay gap is defined as the percentage difference in military versus civilian pay 
growth as measured from a given starting point.  The index used to measure civilian pay 
growth is the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which reflects pay growth in the civilian 
                                                 
26 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, “Fiscal Year 2003Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” 
BUMED Special Pay Page, 2002, 
https://bumed.med.navy.mil/bonus/Eligible%20Recipients%of%20CSRB%20Plan1.pdf./[15 October 
2005].  
27 Navy Department, FY-03 Professions Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), NAVADMIN 
010/03 (Washington DC: 2003) <https://www.buper.navy.mil/navadmin/nav03/nav03010.txt/> [15 October 
2005]. 
28 M. Almendarez, et al. (2001). Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Reported 
to Congress (CRM D0003360.A1). Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 34-35. 
29 Ibid, 34-35. 
30 Ibid, 35. 
31 Ibid, 35. 
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force at large.32  In 1992, the RAND Corporation developed the Defense Employment 
Cost Index (DECI), which attempts to measure civilian pay growth for the subset of 
civilian workers whose composition by age, education, occupation, gender, and 
race/ethnicity represents that of active duty military personnel.  Since that time, pay gaps 
have been based on the ECI versus the DECI by policymakers for officer and enlisted 
personnel by gender and seniority and for occupational and age categories.  The formula 
above is what policymakers use to try and close the discovered pay gaps and to also 
determine the military pay cap. 
According to widely published reports since 1992, a gap of more than an average 
of 13 percent now separates the pay of military personnel from that of their civilian 
counterparts.  Although the reports are not always clear about what they mean by “pay 
gap,” the Dental Corps has found that many potential Dentists considering the Navy 
apparently accept the term at face value as an indication that Navy Dentists earn less than 
they can earn as civilians.  In most studies that have been conducted overall on this 
concern, they would be correct with their assumption.  For example, a recent study states 
“our analysis showed that the uniformed-civilian pay gap existed at every career juncture 
and that this pay gap was greater for Specialists than for General Dentists.”33  More 
specifically, pay gaps of approximately $35,000, $34,000, and $48,000 exist for General 
Dentists with 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15 years of practice, respectively.  For Dental Specialists 
with 11-15 years of practice, the pay gap can be as high as $87,000.34   
           In addition, the CNA study mentioned above also recommends increasing ASP by 
20%, ISP by 25% and the Multi-Year Retention Bonus by 43% for all uniformed 
Dentists.  However, they also recommend the following: 
• More AFHPSP Accessions:  To provide the services with reliable and consistent 
accessions, the services should plan to meet the majority of their total dental 
                                                 
32 J. Hosek, et al. (1994). Military Pay Gaps. (MDA903-90-C-0004). Santa Monica, California: The 
RAND Corporation, ix. 
33 M. Almendarez, et al. (2001). Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Reported 
to Congress (CRM D0003360.A1). Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 113. 
34 Ibid, 113. 
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accessions through the AFHPSP because it has become increasingly difficult to 
acquire Dentists through the direct accession pipeline.35 
• Target Experienced Dentists:  Our proposed changes to ASP are designed as a 
long-term solution to the current problem of a “hole” in the profile of Dentists 
that exists for mid-career Dentists.  Note that our ASP proposal won’t 
immediately remedy the hole, but it will reduce its occurrence in the future.  In 
addition, this hole cannot be filled with new accessions or by improving 
retention of senior Dentists (O-5s and O-6s).  As a short-term way to help fill in 
the hole, we recommend that the services use the $30,000 accession bonus to 
target experienced Dentists who could access as O-4s.  We recognize that this 
will be difficult given the current uniformed-civilian pay gap, but any Dentists 
who can be assessed as O-4s will help alleviate the current problem.  We also 
recommend that the MHS explore expanding the Health Professions Loan 
Repayment Program (HPLRP) as a retention tool by offering to pay the student 
debt for eligible uniformed Dentists facing their first stay-leave military 
decision.36 
• Inflationary Adjustments:  Statutory and discretionary pays should be reviewed 
every three years to consider adjustments in special pays for inflationary 
changes.  Failure to make any adjustments in these pays for inflation will result 
in reduced pay parity and widening pay gaps even if civilian compensation does 
not increase in real terms.  We recommend a review for inflation every three 
years rather than annual adjustment due to the difficulty such a binding 
constraint would place on the services.37    
All of the following recommendations above are outstanding suggestions and 
some have already been implemented or are currently in the process of.  However, the 
study failed to mention a very important recommendation, outsourcing the non-essential 
Specialists for shore based billets.  This option is a viable and affordable one and it will 
be discussed in the upcoming chapters ahead.                                                    
35 M. Almendarez, et al. (2001). Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Reported 
to Congress (CRM D0003360.A1). Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 151. 
36 Ibid, 156. 
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III. A POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON OUTSOURCING 
A. OVERVIEW 
Currently, contractors are performing jobs in “harm’s way” and in a number of 
other areas in all services throughout the world.  This research only proposes that dental 
specialists be hired for shore based non-essential billets.  However, this chapter provides 
an historical perspective on outsourcing and shows the flexibility and usefulness of 
contractors in today’s military. 
The use of contractors serving with the military ranks is not a new concept.  From 
the American Revolution to present day Iraq, contractors have been integral to the 
support of the United States Military during peace and war.  Traditionally, contractors 
have supported logistics and maintenance as well as provided technical assistance.  
“Contractor support is integral to the Navy's history.  Contractors also provided logistical 
support to the fledgling Army during the Revolutionary War, and according to General 
George Washington, the Army's supply improved with the advent of Contractor 
support.”38 
One of the earliest and prevalent uses of contractors on the battlefield came in the 
form of the United States Merchant Marine.  The American Merchant Marine was the 
organization that the Continental Congress’ Maritime Committee drew its first combat 
ships and crews from in the form of Privateers.  These privately owned and armed ships 
were authorized, via letters of marquee, to harass and capture enemy ships, disrupting 
logistics, trade and communications in exchange for a share of captured property.  “The 
largest numbers of Privateers were those that received authorization from the Continental 
Congress.  Altogether, there were not less than 2000 privately armed vessels playing their 
part in the (Revolutionary) war… operated by 70,000 men.”39 
                                                 
38 Michael R. Rampy, “Paradox or Paradigm? Operational Contractor Support,” Military Review, 
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/september_2005/9_05_1.htm (accessed 
September 14, 2005) 
39 Carroll Storrs Alden and Allan Westcott, The United States Navy: A History, (Chicago, Ill: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1943), 12. 
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Privateers were not the only combat ships the colonies had.  A “regular” Navy 
was created also using Sailors and ships contracted from the American Merchant Marine, 
“two-thirds of its ships being made-over Merchantmen and the crews being drawn from 
merchant vessels.”40   
The Army was not afraid of using contractors on the battlefield.  For the Army, 
the line between contractor and mercenary was relatively defined, especially before the 
asymmetric warfare we see in Iraq today.  During the Revolutionary War, the Army used 
contractors primarily for non-combat logistical and medical support.  Until the Civil War, 
jobs such as chaplains, teamsters and blacksmiths were contracted civilians hired to 
follow the Army in most cases.  The Navy contracted with civilians to serve aboard 
combatant ships as doctors and chaplains and these personnel were considered non-
combatants. 
Other services provided were from traveling merchants called Suttlers.  The 
Suttlers were authorized to sell personal goods to soldiers on post or on campaign.  They 
were known as the “traveling merchants” and became an integral part of the military 
system to the point that the Army regulation authorized them to sell to soldiers via a 
strictly regulated credit system in conjunction with the Paymasters of regiments.41  
During peace time, the Suttlers were authorized by the War Department to occupy 
buildings on Army property under the understanding that they would also provide certain 
recreational services and goods to the common soldier.  No government funding was 
given to them and in fact they were solely supported by the common soldier’s 
patronage.42  The practice of Suttlers was used up until the time of the Spanish American 
War, when “The War Department (now Department of the Army) issued General Order 
Number 46 directing Post Commanders to establish an exchange at every post, where  
 
                                                 
40 Alden and Westcott, 16. 
41 Revised United States Army Regulations of 1861 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1863), Article XXV. 
42 George G. Garrett, “The Evolution of and Ever Evolving Army Sports Program,” Army Moral and 
Welfare, http://www.armymwr.com/portal/recreation/sportsandfitness/history/history.asp (accessed 
September 12, 2005) 
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practicable.”43  This was the establishment of the modern Post Exchange (PX) system 
that is still operated for the military by contracted civilians, even in hostile areas such as 
Iraq and Korea. 
 
Use of Contractors in the Military in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: 
At the start of the twentieth century, the United States Merchant Marine again 
played a vital role as military contractors.  Major General Clarence Lang pointed out 
“without the Merchant Marine, the Army cannot go to war.”44  Disrupting enemy supply 
lines has always been a military objective and this was never more prevalent than in the 
World Wars.  In order to prevent a build up of forces in Europe, the German Navy 
directly targeted merchantmen and others as well transiting the Atlantic Ocean.  
Merchant Ships of warring nations have usually been armed, but it was not until World 
War II that American military detachments were assigned to the ships to protect them. 
The American Merchant Marine was also present in numerous military operations 
during World War II.  For example, “about 2,700 Merchant Ships were involved in the 
first wave of the invasion on D-Day, by landing troops and munitions under enemy 
fire.”45  It should be noted that this is the first time that U.S. non-combatant contractors 
were combat casualties.  Arguably, but not unanimously, the Battle of ships in the 
Atlantic during World War II, was the first modern asymmetric battlefield.  Although 
numbers vary among sources, of the “225,000 Seamen and Officers manning the 
American Merchant Marine, almost 6,000 died in action at sea.  Only the Marine Corps 
suffered proportionally higher casualties during the war.”46 
One of the more recent uses of contractors on the battlefield is for the Navy’s 
Construction Battalions.  They originally built bases in outlying and forward areas; 
because they were considered non-combatants it was difficult to employ them in hostile 
                                                 
43 AAFES, “Our History: Highlights,” Army and Air Forces Exchange Services Web Page, 
http://www.aafes.com/pa/history_page.htm (accessed September 12, 2005) 
44 Irwin M. Heine, The United States Merchant Marine: A National Asset  (Washington D.C.: National 
Maritime Council ,1976) 37. 
45 United States Maritime Service Veterans, “U.S. Merchant Marine in World War II,” US Maritime 
Service Veterans Web Page, http://www.usmm.org/ww2.html, (accessed September 14, 2005) 
46 Benjamin W. Labaree... [et al.], America and the Sea: A Maritime History (Mystic, Conn: Mystic 
Seaport, 1998), 581-2. 
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areas where airfields and port facilities needed to be built and repaired.  During early 
World War II, the Seabees, as they are nicknamed, were recruited into military service 
directly from their contracted civilian companies.  In some cases, the entire civilian firm 
was organized into a military unit.  “The earliest Seabees were recruited from the civilian 
construction trades and were placed under the leadership of the Navy's Civil Engineer 
Corps.  Because of the emphasis on experience and skill rather than on physical 
standards, the average age of Seabees during the early days of the war was 37.”47 
 
B. STAKEHOLDERS 
Before the identification and discussion of the stakeholders involved in the issue 
of contractor engagement in the military, there is a need to map out the secondary and 
tertiary issues and construct an issue set so that all the relationships and ‘stakes’ can be 
clearly reflected.  Figure 2 below shows the issue set and this is followed by the 
stakeholders’ map in Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 2.   Stakeholders Issue Set 
Primary Issue Secondary Issue Tertiary Issue 
Crimes committed by Contractors 
Ability to suspend or abandon operations Control and  Accountability 
Financial abuse 
Job creations in civilian sector Macroeconomics 
Government expenditure  
Efficiency  Cost 
Cost effectiveness 
Political price of deploying military 
forces overseas Foreign Policy 
Congressional restrictions on foreign 
policies 





Professional identity and culture 
 
 
                                                 
47 Chief of Naval Information, "Seabee’s," Office of the Chief of Naval Information, 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/personnel/seabees/seabee1.html (accessed August 29, 
2005) 
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Figure 3.   Stakeholders Map 
 
 
The federal government is used loosely here to mean the national political 
leadership.  Federal government concerns are mainly in macroeconomics, cost and 
foreign policy.  The use of civilian contractors increases government expenditure and 
boosts the economy as a whole.  The most often cited ‘official’ reason for the federal 
government is the belief that outsourcing military functions will generate efficiency and 
cost savings, and therefore is a more cost effective solution than maintaining a large 
active force.  Outsourcing can achieve maximum benefits only when there is competition, 
but the market for big military contracts is dominated by a few players.  Security and size 
considerations impose further constraints on competition, frequently resulting in contracts 
being given on a no-bid basis.  Unofficially, the use of contractors allows the federal 
government to carry out foreign operations which may not gain legislative or public 
approval.  For example, it allowed the Bush Administration to circumvent congressional 
limits on the size and scope of the U.S. military’s involvement in Columbia’s civil war.  
It also reduces the political price by enabling the federal government to avoid 
unappealing alternatives such as increasing deployment of its own troops or persuading 
other countries to increase their level of involvement.48   
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In comparison, the stakes for state governments are more direct.  The state 
governments will support the initiative to the extent that the replacement of military 
functions by Contractors is able to create jobs for their states.   
The general public on the other hand, is concerned by reports of overcharging and 
profiteering by the contractors.  They are apprehensive that the use of contractors has 
reduced the federal government’s accountability and opened up avenues for financial 
abuse.  Civilians are enticed by the job opportunities and high pay offered by contractors 
working for the military.  These jobs present opportunities to ‘make a quick buck’ for 
those willing to take higher risks on the battlefield. 
For eligible contractors, the issue centers on the bottom line and potential profits.  
They will therefore abandon or suspend operations when the risk becomes unpalatable, or 
conditions become unprofitable.  In the era of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), contractors 
contend that they are in the best position to provide services which the military find too 
costly to develop and maintain in-house because of their ability to achieve economies of 
scale, and recruit expertise at lower costs.  They argue that the military should focus on 
their core competencies in military operations and leave the non-core ones to them.  This 
position enables them to move in on areas traditionally undertaken by uniformed military 
personnel.  Contractors typically rely on their political connections to enter into the 
military contracting market and obtain attractive ‘cost plus’ contracts.   
The most important reason for DoD to engage contractors is cost.  DoD believes 
that cost savings are possible because contractors enable them to avoid costs associated 
with recruiting, training and providing compensatory benefits in the form of a robust 
health care program, retirement and other factors that contribute to the composite pay of a 
member.  Another advantage for DoD is flexibility.  With contractors, DoD is able to 
enhance its ability to meet surge requirements without maintaining a large force.   
Manpower concerns are obviously the main reason the Dental Corps would want 
to engage contractors.  With the advent of the AVF, the military has competed in the 
labor markets for skilled specialists.  The Dental Corps faces especially significant 
challenges in recruiting high quality Dentists and retaining their services.  By engaging 
contractors, the Navy could focus on core competencies resulting in a strengthened 
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ability to present a more professional and attractive image.  The post-Cold War 
drawdown has reduced the size of the active military significantly.  By using contractors, 
the military aims to minimize impact on mission capabilities.  Likewise, contractors can 
provide the Dental Corps an easily accessible source of expertise, and reduce the Navy’s 
training requirement when deploying advanced technology.  The ability to meet surge 
requirements without long term effects on the manpower structure is another important 
consideration for the Navy. 
While the military acknowledges the advantages of contractor engagement, the 
loss of control is perhaps a matter of concern; which introduces undesirable uncertainty 
into military operations.  With increasing use of contractors, the military is also 
concerned with contractors recruiting high skilled military members by offering higher 
pay.  This would especially be significant for the specialists needed in the Dental Corps.  
Recruiting contractors also challenges the military’s unique culture and professional 
identity.49   
 
C. DISINTERESTED PARTY ANALYSIS 
In the previous sections, we saw concerns of the various stakeholders of the 
outsourcing process.  They center on three central issues: Availability of Manpower, Cost, 
Control and Accountability.   Although the stakeholders have vigorously advocated their 
positions, the reality is that the data remains fairly ambiguous.  In the end, whether or not 
to outsource is a subjective decision and that answer can be found within the affected 
community (ies).  
 
Availability of Manpower: 
Outsourcing has been regarded as a more efficient and effective way for 
performing non-essential military activities.  However, cost-effectiveness may not always 
be the primary motivation.  Other reasons cited, “. . . to gain specialized technical skills,  
 
 
                                                 
49 Peter W. Singer, (2005) Outsourcing War. 
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bypass limits on military personnel that can be deployed to certain regions, and ensure 
that scarce resources are available for other assignments such as medical and dental 
specialists”.50   
Through outsourcing, the military gains some flexibility and does not have a large 
force sitting around the world waiting for a war to break out.  “…if we decide to invade a 
country, we can go out and hire contractors very, very quickly at a rate we would never 
be able to recruit otherwise.”  After the war or when we no longer need the capacity, we 
send them home.51 Also, they can fill the role at shore commands where a need for 
specialists is needed.  For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army has determined 
that some of their combat support jobs are not ‘inherently’ military and contracted them 
out to companies.  Contracting roles usually involve logistics, transportation, supply, 
food service, medical and some security.   
Cost: 
One of the arguments presented for using contractors is that it saves taxpayer’s 
money.  The salary paid to a soldier on active duty for example, can be about $35,000 a 
year, which does not include the costs of recruiting, training, pay, benefits and retirement.  
“News reports on the war in Iraq have noted the relatively high salaries of contractors, 
$20,000 per month, triple or more what active-duty soldiers earn. . . “.52 
According to Peter Singer, author of Private Warriors, there has been no proven 
cost savings.  He feels that the savings associated with Contractors are political.  “A 
military manpower expansion, the number of Reserves and National Guard activated or 
needing our Allies for support.”53  A report from GAO, July 2005, stated that Department 
of Defense, Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
have complete data on the costs of using private security Contractors.   
                                                 
50Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Mercenaries” by Deborah Avant, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story (accessed September 15, 2005). 
51 PBS, Frontline: “Private Warriors: Contractors: Outsourcing the Mission”, by Steven Schooner, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/out.html (accessed September 15, 
2005).  
52 Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Mercenaries” by Deborah Avant. 
53 PBS, Frontline: “Private Warriors: Contractors: Does Privatization Save Money”, Peter Singer, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/out.html (accessed September 15, 
2005).  
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Control and Accountability: 
One of the major concerns is that Contractors are accountable to no one and that 
they increase the military’s workload.  Peter Singer discusses loss of control with 
Contractors.  Contractors are hired by private businesses to perform military functions 
that are not under control of the Combatant Commander.  At anytime, they can abandon 
their operations for any reason (unprofitable, unsafe) which then leaves the military 
undermanned and in a dangerous position.54 
 
Public Law 108-375, Section 1206 Report: 
Another point of view is that Contractors are controlled through legislation, like 
Public Law 108-375.  This law describes two types of Contractors that support deployed 
military forces and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  Contractors supporting the deployed 
forces provide services to Combat Commanders that usually involve transportation, 
laundry, billeting and food services.  Contractors that do not support deployed forces are 
performing reconstruction duties and private security.  Site security   involves site 
surveys, coordination of logistics and to assess structures and facilities.  Both of these 
categories of Contractors rely heavily on coordination with each other.55 
Contractors in Iraq are governed by laws, regulations and guidelines described in 
these laws as in the following: 
Internal: 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) System 
Heads of Federal Agencies 
Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) 
Contracting Officer 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR) 
 
 
                                                 
54 Brookings Institute: “Outsourcing War” by Peter Singer, Foreign Affairs, March 2005, 
http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page (accessed September 15, 2005). 
55 International Public Management News:  US:  Study of Contractors In Iraq, “Section 1206 Public 
Law 108-375 Report, p3-4. http//inpuma.typepad.com/blog/2005/09/us_study_of_con.html (accessed 
September 15, 2005). 
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External: 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
Section (b) (1) of the report describes the chain of command and the oversight 
mechanisms in place for supervision of Contractor employees in security roles.  
Essentially, the commanders have no contractual agreements with the contractors, so it is 
imperative that coordination take place in addition to oversight by the respective external 
agencies.56 
Another form of accountability is that Contractors are accountable to their 
employers and subject to market incentives.  “. . . Contractors consider how that request 
might affect their other customers, broader market reputation, and ultimately, their 
earnings.”57 
 
Availability of Manpower:   
Contracted labor has been used to support numerous major conflicts and non-
essential billets in this nation’s history, as well as the histories of many other nations.  
Examples of Contractors cutting and running whether on the battlefield or serving in a 
shore based billet are few and far between.  In the end, there is little reason to doubt that 
any contracts signed will not be completed as agreed.  With that said, there is evidence 
that the in-house uniform manpower will be much more flexible, readily available and 
easier to deploy on short notice with the above complement.   
Cost:   
                                                 
56 International Public Management News:  US:  Study of Contractors In Iraq, “Section 1206 Public 
Law 108-375 Report, p 6. http//inpuma.typepad.com/blog/2005/09/us_study_of_con.html (accessed 
September 15, 2005). 
57 Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Mercenaries” by Deborah Avant, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story (accessed September 15, 2005). 
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In spite of efforts to quantify the costs associated with outsourcing (as opposed to 
insourcing), no clear data exists.  In some cases, the contract is clearly cheaper to the 
alternative of home-growing and maintaining a capability, but there are also examples 
where the contract may end up costing more money such as in Iraq.  Although contracted 
labor may initially appear to be cheaper, the actual cost differential (more / same / less), 
however, cannot be known in advance – too many factors are at play (i.e., intensity, 
duration, security, etc). 
 
Control / Accountability:   
Although contracted labor can fill a near-term shortage, the greatest danger can be 
in the area of control and accountability.  At best, contract labor works through a dual 
chain of command (both the parent company as well as the government); at worst, 
contract labor only works through the parent company.  This can complicate matters for 
the government official in charge of a particular operation or service.: 
Contract labor is a necessary component of success.  There are no plausible 
examples of instances where government can possess sufficient in-house resources 
required to accomplish all tasks.  As such, we need to prepare to plug gaps with 
Contractors when they may be needed.  We must therefore do the best that we can to 
predict the circumstances under which the contract will operate – when the prediction 
shows that an operation or service will be long, we may realize lower costs by insourcing.  
But, when the operation is likely to be short in duration with few security risks, 
contracted labor may work best.  This is debatable however. 
In any case, contract representatives should ensure that the contracts are written 
into the position descriptions in such a way as to provide the government with the 
greatest amount of control over the deployment, policies, procedures and actions of the 
Contractors.    
 
D. INTERESTED PARTY ANALYSIS 
The United States Military is organized for war plans and operations.  Operations 
other than war that include nation building and support are not currently part of the 
28 
primary mission of the military.  As such, this latter day requirement has proven to be 
foreign to the military.  Nation building, like in Iraq, is best suited to capitalists and the 
calculated risks they take in economies throughout the world.  Capitalism is what builds 
economies and promotes prosperity amongst those involved.  That said, the question of 
what comes first, prosperity or security is not precisely the same as the “chicken-and-the-
egg” question, says Thomas Foley, Director of Private Sector Development of the former 
Provisional Authority in Iraq.  Thomas Foley points out three key factors for the 
interrelationship between prosperity and security: 
Security and prosperity are related, he said during an interview.  With 
prosperity, people have a stake in the economy.  There's a lot more 
pressure for people not to be disrupted.  A second point is that prosperous 
people have more money to invest in security.  They can fund the law 
enforcement agencies and pay for the infrastructure that ensures the rule of 
law.  But security too, is necessary.  Prosperity is hard to start, he noted, if 
the security environment is such that people are afraid to go to work, or if 
investors are afraid to put their money at risk.  I don't think either could be 
called the chicken or the egg, he said.  It's somewhere between. 58   
Discussion of the link between security and prosperity lends credibility to the link 
existing today between the U.S. Military and private sector Contractors.  The military 
consistently maintains the ability to turn the spigot on and off for opening and closing 
contracts with private industry.  Big business is happy to expand its revenue streams.  
Examples of private industry contracts with the Department of Defense (DoD) in Iraq can 
be found at the U.S. Department of Commerce website www.export.gov/iraq.  
Contractors do not necessarily have to be limited to cooking meals and cleaning latrines 
for the battlefield contracts.     
The U.S. Department of Commerce provided clear examples in 2004 of monetary 
figures for military contracts: 
a.) U.S. Army – Up to 4.13 billion for contracts with Perini Corp, Fluor-AMEC 
JV, Lucent Technologies, Parsons Delaware, Inc, and KBR to name a few. 
b.) U.S. Navy – Up to 1.7 billion for contracts with Fluor-AMEC JV, Washington 
International, and Black/Veatch JV. 
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The Department of Commerce indicated that these contracts were for basic 
infrastructure like public works and water (Navy) and buildings, education and health 
(Army) to name just a few.59 
 
Necessity of Profit:  
Big business characterizes military contracts by projected Returns on Investment 
(ROI).  If the contract ROI does not exceed the company’s cost of capital, they will not 
take it.  This makes perfect sense in that it allows the company to maintain financial 
solvency and to maintain a job base across many different local economies.  Exploiting 
DoD opportunities is fair from the free market perspective.  The more profitable the 
contracts, the greater the likelihood that private companies will join the defense 
contracting market.  In the long run, this would provide a larger pool of contractors for 
DoD.  Additionally, cost-plus contracts enable companies to continue profiting, thereby 
promoting further growth and expansion of intellectual capital.  Growth of the nation’s 
industrial base allows for improved leverage of corporate assets whenever the next 
contingency operations emerge.   
It is an economic necessity that big business profit from dealings with the DoD.  
If not allowed to negotiate profitable contracts, the pool of contractors and business 
willing to serve will dry up.  Additionally, the more lucrative the contracts, the faster 
contractors will respond to DoD requests and operations.  DoD would only hurt itself if it 
consistently removed profits from contracts.  Doing this would increase the likelihood 
that companies will either exit the pool of available DoD contractors, or only fill 
contracts after exhausting all other more profitable jobs. 
Contractor Pay:   
The pool of contractors available to the military may be constrained by the Area 
of Operation.  In the case of Iraq, contractors earn justifiable wage premiums relative to 
military personnel.  These compensating wage differentials are justified in that 
contractors responding to work in areas like Iraq get them only while in that area and are 
easier targets than armed combatants.  Compensating wage differentials should exist to 
                                                 
59 “Chart of DoD Prime Contractors” http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/dod_prime.pdf, 2004. 
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attract civilian contractors since corporations would otherwise not be able to order these 
personnel into hostile environments, unlike what the military can do.  The military’s 
hierarchal structure and ownership of personnel via contracts makes it easier to pay lower 
relative wages while deploying personnel into hostile environments. 
National Security:  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard B. Myers, specifically 
addresses contractors in the “The National Military Strategy of America.”  He notes that 
the nation’s ability to sustain mobility across a wide range of operations requires 
“retaining highly qualified people in the Active and Reserve Components as well as 
within the DoD civilian and contracted workforce.”  He follows this assertion with an 
emphasis on the need for “a seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve Component, DoD 
civilians, and contracted workforce.”60  These statements are the likely result of our 
nation’s position as the global Hegemon.61  This unique position as the premier world 
superpower requires it to police others and remain capable of deploying and sustaining 
assets abroad.  From a private company’s perspective, DoD must continue to develop ties 
with private companies in order to innovate and maintain its ability to meet its ever 
changing mission requirements such as nation building.  If not, the military may enjoy 
less success in future missions, thereby impairing the U.S. position.   
Conclusion: 
While the United States will clearly remain the world’s sole military superpower, 
the playing field will be economically multipolar, giving the “connected system” of 
countries the opportunity to vote with their reserve currency choices on competing future 
visions.  As America continues to provide and “outsource” security services throughout 
the world on global terrorism to try and lead the world to a better place, they are really 
waging a war on the “disconnectedness” of countries and states not currently in the 
connected system of states.  In other words, we are attempting to connect those countries 
                                                 
60 Richard B. Myers.  “National Military Strategy of America.” Office of Secretary of Defense.  2004.  
pp 16, 23.  Found at: 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_377_National%20Military%20Strategy%2013%20
May%2004.pdf 
61 Merriam Webster’s collegiate dictionary (10th ed.), (1993). “Hegemon: Stems from the word 
hegemony, which is defined as the predominant influence, as of a state, region, or group, over another or 
others.”  Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster. 
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and states that are disconnected culturally and economically from the modernized 
countries and states, i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq to just name a few.   
In order to “connect” or globalize these countries and states, it takes people, 
energy, investments and security.  Before long, private investment will begin to invade 
Iraq instead of more tanks and they will begin to become more connected to the 
modernized world.  Contractors will play a vital role in achieving a successful outcome in 
situations like Iraq as war is waged on terrorism and these disconnected countries and 
states begin to become globalized into the modern world as well as providing a needed 
service on shore commands.  Contractors always have and always will continue to 
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IV. OUTSOURCING TOOLS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Business Cases and Business Case Analyses (BCAs) have become a fact of life 
for DoD Program Managers.  Used well, they can do much to make sense of the very 
difficult environment of contemporary defense management.62  For example, Navy 
Medicine recently converted 1,772 non-essential military billets to civilian or contract 
positions during FY2005.63  The Navy Surgeon General’s personnel programmers and 
ongoing studies regarding military readiness requirements suggest that this conversion is 
just the beginning of ultimately converting a total of approximately 5,415 identified as 
“non-essential shore based billets” by the Total Health Care Support Readiness 
Requirement (THCSRR) and Navy Medicine. 
This shift in resource allocation or “transformation” initiated in 2001 by the 
Department of Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld is designed to serve as a catalyst 
towards a more effective and efficient DoD.  Navy Medicine’s manpower and resource 
management experts have been working with representatives from the Medical, Dental, 
Medical Service, Nurse and Hospital Corps Chiefs/Director’s offices, and the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA) to develop the economic analyses needed to achieve the goals of 
a more efficient and effective human capital strategy.  In addition to the 1,772 military to 
civilian conversions in FY2005, Navy Medicine successfully integrated their Dental 
Treatment Facilities (DTFs) with the Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) and merging 
all Dental Technician’s with the Hospital Corpsman into a single rate. 
These initiatives are very much in line with the Navy’s FY2004 human resource 
philosophy, which includes maximizing civilian and contract personnel for non-essential 
positions.  The conversion of these positions will help alleviate the stress that has been 
                                                 
62 Raymond E. Franck, (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business Case 
Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View. Retrieved 13 October 2005 from 
Naval Postgraduate School Library Web site: 
http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/publications/FY04/AM-04013.pdf 
63 Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712, Military to Civilian Conversions, directed that a total of 
20,070 DoD-Wide military positions be converted to civilian positions between FY04 and FY05.  The 
Navy’s Defense Health Program was directed to convert a total of 1,772 military billets as part of the total 
20,070 conversion target 
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put on the operating forces and ensure that military personnel are used to perform the 
tasks that are military essential.64  Furthermore, the PBD 712 also states the increased 
operational tempo of the U. S. forces and current fiscal constraints requires the DoD to 
make maximum use of its human resources and to ensure that military personnel are used 
to perform tasks that are “military essential.”65 
In this era of new complexities, new mandates and worrisome resource 
constraints, it is especially important that defense analysts and managers of all types, but 
Program Managers especially, make resource-allocation decisions informed by solid 
analysis.  BCAs are intended to provide that basis.66   
A BCAs purpose is to develop a business process improvement as a key strategy 
and management tool, capable of supporting an organization’s vision, mission, goals and 
objectives.  However, in this new environment created within DoD, the aim of an 
analysis should be to produce “a quantum leap in performance and effectiveness.”  
Historically, BCAs have produced huge results for businesses implementing new work 
processes that fit into their existing structure.  Their success has depended on whether or 
not they took the time to study the useful analytical methods given to them from an 
effective BCA.  A BCA on contracting dental specialties will be no different. 
This chapter will discuss theoretical foundations of methods used for BCAs in 
Section B that will include; problem-solving, an input-output analysis, Transactions Cost 
Economics (TCE) and Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).  Section C will discuss an overview 
of manpower calculations and methods in the first section followed by the A-76 process 
and conclude with a risk assessment method as proposed by a recent NPS thesis.  This 
discussion will reference heavily from Franck and his sponsored report series on First 
Principles View of Outsourcing. 
 
 
                                                 
64 Former Surgeon General of the Navy, “Defense Subcommittee Hearing on Medical Programs 
Testimony,” 2004, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220818/ [28 April 2004]. 
65 Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712 (2003). Military to Civilian Conversions, Department of 
Defense, Washington, DC. 
66 Raymond E. Franck, (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business Case 
Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View.  
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B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
1. Structuring and Solving Problems 
            Let us take a look at Professor Franck’s five-step method with notes:                                    
            a. Understand the problem:  Possession of a clear statement of a difficult question 
and considerable relevant expertise does not guarantee sufficient understanding to reach 
the best solution.  It’s important first to thoroughly understand the context.  To take a 
very simple example, suppose our “problem” is to insert a fastener in a block of wood.  If 
at first inspection the fastener appears to be a nail, it is natural to consider the alternatives 
that involve hammers.  If a closer look reveals the fastener is a screw, then it’s apparent 
the hammers in our toolbox are less useful than the appropriate screwdriver.  That is, lack 
of understanding can greatly affect the solution.67 
As such, understanding the objectives is critical.  However, the analyst must also 
identify the optimal outcome in order for the process of outsourcing to have a positive 
effect on either efficiency or effectiveness.  For the purpose of this study, the problem is 
identified as a shortage of military dentists because the programs for recruiting and the 
special pays and bonuses for retaining them are not working.  Therefore, the optimal 
outcome for outsourcing civilian Endodontists is to assist commands immediately for 
manpower due to the shortage and be more cost effective than the current structure as I 
will demonstrate in next chapter.  
b. Develop Alternatives:  If we understand the problem, then we can consider 
useful ways to solve (or at least mitigate) the problem’s negative aspects.  Typically, a 
number of alternatives are available.  They are best understood as “courses of action” or 
“programs,” not as titles.  Accordingly, it is useful to develop (as outlines) alternatives 
suitable for plans which are executable.68 
 The Navy spends more money on incentives and other costly programs in order to 
try and attract dentists in order to fulfill their mission.  So far, the incentives and 
programs are falling short of the set goals.  This current trend may suggest that Navy 
Medicine look into another alternative such as outsourcing. 
                                                 
67 Raymond E. Franck, (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business Case 
Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View. 
68 Ibid. 
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c. Predict Consequences:  Consequences should be associated with each 
alternative.  Consequences typically are manifested in both effectiveness (what’s gained) 
and costs (what’s given up or risks incurred).  While alternatives in real problems have a 
large number of consequences, some tell more about achieving the objectives than others.  
In many complex problems, prediction involves modeling, a formal process of relating 
key features of the alternatives to their important consequences.69  
The goal for this thesis is to develop a tool and step-by-step process for the Dental 
Corps to do a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of their specialties that links well with this 
particular rule. 
d. Assess the Consequences:  The analyst should then assess the consequences 
associated with the alternatives.  This may be relatively easy or quite difficult.  
Alternatives, which are less effective and more costly than others, are said to be 
“dominated,” and are not candidates for implementation.  Similarly, if all available 
alternatives are equally costly (or equally effective), then the most effective (or least 
costly) alternative is clearly best.70 
 Thus far, the alternatives chosen by the Dental Corps for recruiting and retaining 
dentists are looking to be considered as “dominated.”  This suggests that the Dental 
Corps should begin to look at alternative methods to accomplish the mission. 
e. Make a Decision (Or, provide a recommendation).  In many respects, this phase 
of the process involves reconsideration and review of the entire process, especially the 
quality and relevance of the analysis.  It is useful to consider whether further iterations of 
the process are useful.  If the analysis includes assumed, or baseline, values of key 
parameters, it is important to consider how results vary (if at all) with different values of 
those parameters (sensitivity analysis).71 
 This study intends to use each of these rules in basing a recommendation for 
outsourcing shore based non-essential specialty billets.  In summary, this study will base 
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a recommendation on the analysis conducted.  This study’s hypothesis is that further 
analysis will not improve the quality of my conclusion.  At that time, I can then make my 
best decision and/or recommendation to Navy Medicine’s decision makers. 
 
2. Input-Output Analysis 
Input-Output analysis originated as a method of studying the operations of an 
entire economy.  It postulates a number of sectors (or industries) and a number of primary 
factors of production (the most important being labor).  The primary factors (or inputs) 
support the various industries.  Industries support each other; intermediate goods flow 
within industries and between industries.  Thus, for example, a finished automobile may 
have an engine supplied by another automobile firm, and tires purchased from the rubber 
products industry.  Every primary input is supplied to the goods-producing sectors.  
Labor services are part of every industry’s production process.72 
This study will use the military input-output model that is similar, but more 
hierarchical and simpler.  For example, if we use four sectors: Capability designated as 
(C), Infrastructure designated as (I), Manpower designated as (M) and Support 
designated as (S), the model would resemble Table 5 below: 
 
 
Table 5.     A Military Input-Output Model  




Capability (C) aCC 0 0 0 FC QC 
Support (S) aSC aSS 0 0 0 QS 
Infrastructure (I) aIC aIS aII 0 0 QI 
Manpower (M) aMC aMS aMI aMM 0 M 
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The model shown above has four sectors.  The Capabilities Sector delivers to 
Final Demand and the Capabilities Sector itself.  The Support Sector provides support for 
the Capabilities Sector and itself.  The Infrastructure Sector delivers to the Capabilities 
and Support Sectors, as well as itself.  Lastly, the Manpower Sector supports all of the 
other Sectors as well as itself. 
We can now include the equation for using contractor services instead of in-house 
activities with the exception of the Capability Sector and have outputs as shown below: 
QC = (1-aCC) QC + FC 
QS = QSO + CS = aSC QC + aSS QS 
QI = QIO + CI = aIC QC + aIS QS + aII QI 
M = MO + CM = aMC QC + aMS QS + aMI QI + aMM MO, 
Now, we can solve the system of equations above: 
 QC = FC / (1-aCC) 
 QSO = FC * {aSC / [(1-aCC) (1-aSS)]} - CS 
 QIO = FC * {aSC aIS + aIC (1-aSS)} / {(1-aCC) (1-aSS) (1-aII)} -CI  
 MO = {FCaMC/[(1-aCC) (1-aMM)]} + {FC(aMSaSC)/[(1-aCC) (1-aSS) (1-aII)} 
  + {FCaMIaIC/[(1-aCC) (1-aSS) (1-aII)]} 
  + {FCaMIaISaSC)/[(1-aCC) (1-aSS) (1-aII) (1-aMM)]} – CM/(1-aMM) 
 The results above show that the total level of activities in the Capabilities Sector 
depends directly on the operational capabilities delivered.  Also, appropriate levels of 
activity in the Infrastructure and Support Sectors depend on operational capabilities 
required and to the extent by which military activities are replaced by contractors.   
The model indicates there are both direct and indirect military manpower 
reductions when hiring contractors.  Directly, contractor support leads to replacing 
military manpower in the affected community; indirectly, there is a reduction in the 
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personnel support side of the house.  Personnel support could be administration, 
personnel, recruiting and training, and so forth. 
However, contractors will have personnel support issues as well.  Also, those 
requirements will be similar to those of military manpower.  However, support 
requirements for contractors are included in the contract proposal. 
In conclusion, this model will attempt to demonstrate the real savings that can be 
achieved in personnel support for contractors that is above and beyond those not directly 
involved in the military manpower. 
 
3. Transactions Cost Economics 
There is a private-sector counterpart to the choice of support-service sourcing 
with organic assets or contractors.  It has become a standard part of economic theory.  
The seminal work is generally acknowledged as coming from Ronald Coase in 1937.  If 
most productive tasks can be accomplished with greater efficiency elsewhere, then what 
reason would firms in search of profit have to produce those goods and services within 
the enterprise boundaries?  The answer to the question is that going to the market to 
acquire such goods and services carries with it certain “transactions costs,” which might 
turn out to be greater than the added costs associated with production in-house.  Thus, 
study of make-or-buy decisions and similar issues is often called “transactions cost 
economics.”73 
The make-or-buy decision can bring disadvantages for organic assets.  For 
example, firms specialize in their area of producing or performing goods and services 
because the probability is that the firm is economically efficient at this process.  In a 
competitive market, a firm must be good at this with their assets and must operate their 
business efficiently.  If not, it would be wise to consider contracting the item or service 
for less money.      
Keeping goods or services in-house can also bring additional costs such as 
“agency” and “influence” costs.  If the firm has a protected customer base, there will be 
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less incentive to improve the quality or efficiency of the product or service.  Thus, 
performance is an ongoing concern and ensuring peak performance occurs takes 
management oversight and oversight comes with a cost due to commitment of resources.  
This particular cost could be avoided by outsourcing the product or service.  The possible 
distortions of corporate decision-making that can lead to losses through competition or 
profit are referred to as influence costs, and must be considered when maintaining 
organic assets vice outsourcing. 
However, there are disadvantages to outsourcing as well of course.  Coordination 
is important if outsourcing a particular product that requires a just-in-time delivery.  If it 
is a service required, such as a dentist’s specialty, coordination is not a factor.  Defining 
actual transactions costs depends on the chosen outsourced product or service explicitly.  
On one hand, outsourcing a major IT network such as the NMCI would involve a long-
term and highly complicated agreement, as it has.  On the other hand, outsourcing for a 
unique expertise such as a dentist’s specialty may provide monopoly power because there 
are no substitutes for the services required.  This may cause vulnerability to opportunistic 
behavior from the contractor and they very well could exploit their power by demanding 
renegotiating of the contract or dissolve the agreement altogether.  In Transactions Cost 
Economics, this is referred to as a “holdup.”74  
Vulnerability to a “holdup” can be significantly decreased with the 
implementation of a well-crafted contract however.  Also, the contract will need to be 
reviewed annually at the minimum in order to try and avoid any possible “holdups.”  
Furthermore, the firm must keep in mind that contracts cannot completely hedge against 
risks of opportunistic behavior.  So, it would be advantageous on the part of the 
enterprise that’s outsourcing to have some sort of risk reduction capability in place.  In 
the situation with the Dental Corps, active duty dentists will always be part of the military 
health care system’s safety net.  Contractors will involve complimenting active duty 
manpower, not replacing it. 
As posited by Professor Franck in his work and the conventional wisdom 
provided by most of the literature dealing with transactions costs, the standard bottom 
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line is that the decision to outsource should not be taken lightly.  While the potential 
production-cost savings may well be tempting, there are associated costs and risks, albeit 
less obvious.  They are less important (and might be negligible) for simple, one-time 
transactions where alternate suppliers are readily available.  They can be critically 
important when the outsourcing arrangement is such that there is only one supplier 
readily available in a complex and lengthy relationship.75 
Hence, the decision to outsource must weigh production cost savings against the 
costs and risks associated with a critical source of supply being outside the firm’s control.  
Those are generally referred to as the transactions cost of the outsourcing relationship.  
Thus, outsourcing is preferred only if the total costs are less than the costs of production 
with the firm’s (in-house, organic) assets.  A firm should outsource only if the following 
is true: 
Cost of in-house production > Outsourcing + Transactions Costs.76         
 
4. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
CBA is a well-defined method to “appraise an investment project which includes 
all social and financial costs and benefits.”  It is the subject of extensive literature that 
includes standard textbooks such as Boardman.  The basic foundation of standard CBA 
methods is total willingness to pay.  The basic criterion for the assessment is simple 
(perhaps deceptively so):77 
Net Benefit = Benefits – Costs. 
The complicated task is finding all the benefits and costs, which entails a detailed 
and systematic analysis.  One industry standard for the major steps in a well-done CBA 
comes from Boardman,78 and is summarized as follows: 
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1.  Specify the set of alternative projects. 
2.  Decide whose costs and benefits count.  Who has “standing,” or is a legitimate                         
stakeholder? 
3.  Catalog impacts, and select metrics. 
4.  Predict the impacts over the life of the project. 
5.  Attach monetary values to all impacts. 
6.  Discount benefits and costs for each alternative to Present Values (PV). 
7.  Calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) for each alternative. 
8.  Perform an appropriate sensitivity analysis. 
9.  Make a best-value recommendation based on the NPV and the sensitivity 
analysis.79 
Completed CBAs can then support decisions, using the following general rules: 
1.  A project is worth doing (valid) if its net benefits are positive: i.e., benefits 
exceed costs. 
2.  A project that can be undertaken at various levels should be expanded as long 
as incremental benefits cover incremental costs. 
3.  The alternative (or strategy) with highest net benefit offers best value and is, 
therefore, preferred.80 
 
C. MANPOWER CALCULATIONS AND METHODS 
1. Overview 
The Navy uses the OPNAVINST 1000.16J for all manpower concerns and 
requirements.  This instruction is the “go-to” manual for providing guidance and 
procedures to develop, review, approve and implement total force manpower 
requirements and authorizations for all naval activities. 
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Requirements for naval activities are based on the minimum manpower needed to 
perform the task needed for the mission of the unit.  The nature of the tasks determines 
manpower quality specified in terms defined by ratings, grades, subspecialties and 
classification codes.  The definition of these tasks to be performed is written out in detail 
through the Command’s Mission, Functions and Task Statement (MFT) or the Required 
Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE).  For example, 
the OPNAVINST 5450.215B shows how the Chief of Naval Operations exercises 
authority by specifically defining the mission and functions for the Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery.  This is just a portion of how workload is determined and how the Navy 
places “faces” into “spaces.”  
Tasks are assigned a justifiable number of work hours and each command has a 
“standard Navy work week” that is defined in either the MFT or the ROC/POE.  For 
example, a shore activity has a standard work week of 40 hours as written in the MFT.  
The 40 hours are defined as 33.38 hours for planning purposes and the remaining 6.62 
hours are for training, service “diversion,” leave and holidays.  In addition, suppose that a 
Naval Hospital must maintain a watch at the front desk continuously for a 24-hour period 
and that it requires three persons to do it (168 hours per week).  The manpower required 
to accomplish this particular watch would be 15.10 (168*3/33.38 = 15.10). 
As such, manpower requirements of naval activities are all pieced together 
through a number of sources and building blocks, each of which is equally important.  
Each activity’s manpower requirement is recorded on the Activity Manpower Document 
(AMD), which is the sole authority for these particular requirements.  The AMD is the 
qualitative and quantitative expression of manpower requirements and authorizations 
allocated to a naval activity to perform the assigned MFT statement or ROC/POE.  Total 
force requirements are tracked using the Total Force Manpower Management System 
(TFMMS), which is the single, authoritative database for total force manpower 
requirements and authorizations and end strength.  A change to a command’s workload, 
rating or nature of task would require a Total Force Micro Manpower Change 
Application (TMMCA) be submitted for approval so that the appropriate changes are   
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reflected in the AMD.  Navy Medicine has also implemented the Total Health Care 
Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR) to assist in the process and compliment 
TFMMS. 
The manpower authorization process is not as specific, per se, as the requirements 
process.  A manpower authorization describes a manpower requirement supported by 
approved funding and end strength.  Authorizations are a reflection of claimant choices 
and resource sponsor funding.  They are the basis for the planning and distribution of 
military personnel inventory and represent estimates for use in planning and 
programming through TFMMS and the AMD.  Therefore, assigned personnel can never 
exceed authorized personnel as set by the Officer Program Authorization and Enlisted 
Program Authorization approved biannually by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education. 
Upon examination, the previously discussed input-output perspective that was 
discussed previously closely resembles the manpower requirement process.  For example, 
ships home ported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii have a defined mission directly related to 
providing operational capability, while shore based units have a sole function of 
supporting the operational ships.  A large portion of that support is related directly to the 
operational ships particular missions; Naval Medical Clinic Hawaii is just one example.  
Therefore, suppose that the Navy decides to downsize the number of ships home ported 
in Pearl Harbor.  As a result, the AMD of Naval Medical Clinic Hawaii would be 
recalculated, based on the change in the scale of tasks to be performed due to the 
downsizing of the operational ships.  This is the “multiplier” property of the input-output 
model that was discussed previously. 
Likewise, if Naval Medical Clinic Hawaii were to outsource some of their 
position descriptions and billets to contractor personnel, then the manpower requirements 
would need to be recalculated for the AMD just as they were in the previous example.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, THCSRR has identified military position descriptions 
and billets to be replaced by contractor personnel.  Thus, this exact scenario has already 
transpired in some of the MTFs in the Navy.  THCSRR has given Navy Medicine a 
manpower database that can perform the calculations as described above quickly and 
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accurately.  As following sections will show, a good Human Resources Information 
System (HRIS) is vital to the success of the organization.   
The extent to which the AMDs of operational units are explicitly tied to the 
AMDs of their supporting units is not clear.  Likewise, it is not clear to the extent at 
which changes in the AMDs are explicitly tied to the TFMMS.81  This statement 
expresses where the majority of Navy activities are in the world of manpower and HRIS.  
However, a review of the current plans and programs suggests that Navy Medicine is 
definitely ahead of the pack in regards to versions of HRIS used in the Navy, making 
them relatively more effective and efficient. 
BUMED and Navy Medicine have always used various forms of an HRIS through 
the years for different reasons.  In the beginning however, templates existed through 
stovepipe means for various purposes, but they have now integrated most of those 
systems into programs that all medical personnel can use for the greater good.  A solid 
example of this is the Expeditionary Medicine Platform Augmentation Readiness 
Training System (EMPARTS) and THCSRR.  
EMPARTS and THCSRR were developed specifically for strategic purposes and 
have thus far performed flawlessly together in the manner that they were designed for.  
THCSRR identifies the minimum number of Navy medical personnel to support the 
military’s missions while balancing Navy Medicine’s dual missions – force health 
protection and beneficiary care.  As such, many medical personnel are assigned to shore-
based billets to support the beneficiary mission; however, they must be ready to mobilize 
on short notice to support the force health protection mission.  The use of component unit 
identification codes (CUICs) has facilitated the assignment of medical personnel in a 
manner that identifies the unit they will support during mobilization.  Consequently, 
BUMED needs to track and maintain information on personnel to ensure the highest level 
of readiness.   
EMPARTS is the Human Resource Information System (HRIS) currently 
employed to assist in maintaining the readiness of all BUMED personnel.  EMPARTS 
                                                 
81 Raymond E. Franck, (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business Case 
Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View.  
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was implemented on 1 October 2002 as a web-based database developed to enhance 
readiness reporting.  It was designed as an interim solution and its functionality will be 
incorporated into the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).  
Initially, EMPARTS sought to track readiness status including: percent of billets filled, 
training of assigned personnel, readiness of CUICs and individual, as well as 
administrative requirements.  
The functionality of the system is constantly enhanced based on user input.  Two 
broad view categories are available – a command-level view and a headquarters-level 
view.  In the command level view, information is only available for a specific command.  
The headquarters-level view provides aggregate information on all commands with the 
ability to view specific command-level information.  The headquarters-level view is 
available to BUMED Headquarters and non-BUMED Headquarters (i.e., 
MARFORLANT) that have a need to track personnel within their command.   
Personnel assignments within EMPARTS are driven by unit identification code 
(UIC) and billet sequence code (BSC).  Since officers are detailed by UIC and BSC, the 
platform assignment is straightforward; however, enlisted personnel are detailed only by 
UIC.  Therefore, a thorough understanding of the AMD is required to ensure the 
appropriate assignment to meet the BSC requirements.  Furthermore, TFMMS are 
uploaded automatically at the headquarters level.  Unfortunately, personnel platform 
assignment discrepancies created by TFMMS changes must be manually corrected at the 
command level.  However, this still exceeds most naval activities.  
At the individual level, EMPARTS stores information concerning the person’s 
demographic information, readiness elements, training information, platform assignment, 
uniform and gear sizes.  The information is used to calculate readiness indicators for 
administrative requirements, training requirements, and medical/dental requirements for 
each individual.  At the platform level, EMPARTS aggregates the individual data to 
provide readiness indicators for the overall platform based on the same requirements.  
The aggregated platform readiness is then displayed in a dashboard metric format for 
each command.  As members transfer from one command to another, their information is 
removed from their previous command; however, it is retained in the database and is 
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available for the next command to accept them without losing their information.  
Hyperlinks are provided throughout EMPARTS to provide easy navigation to the desired 
information.  In addition, EMPARTS also provides several query options to create ad hoc 
reports to assist in managing readiness.   
The dynamic and ever-changing functionality of EMPARTS has significantly 
enhanced operational readiness reporting within BUMED fulfilling the goal of having a 
strategy-based system for Navy Medicine.  Previously, each command maintained 
information on their personnel in isolation and headquarters had no mechanism to verify 
the accuracy of readiness reports.  Given the current operational environment especially, 
EMPARTS is an exceptional HRIS designed primarily for medical readiness, but its 
design and capability have made it adaptable in the current and upcoming challenges for 
today’s transforming Navy.    
The Dental Corps is obviously a part of EMPARTS and THCSRR, but they 
designed an HRIS specifically for dental functions and needs as well, “The Dental 
Common Access System (DENCAS).”  The U.S. Navy Medical Information 
Management Command (NMIMC) and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) 
saw a need to develop an HRIS to gather Dental readiness and productivity information 
for all of the Navy’s Dental Department’s.  The Department of the Navy’s Smart Card 
Office (DONSCO) funded the project because it had the capability to use digital 
certificates stored on DoDs Common Access Card (CAC).  DONSCO, NMIMC and 
BUMED all worked closely with the private contractor, MAXIMUS, on this one-year 
project.   
The system is comprised of a web-based application with a centralized database.  
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to provide non-repudiation of a user’s identity 
with the subsequent permissions structure being database driven.  The DENCAS system 
was developed in September of 2000, and was deployed in June of 2001 for beta testing 
at a number of selected pilot sites. 
Prior to DENCAS implementation, Navy dental patient treatment and productivity 
data was collected from over 400 commands in separate standalone MS-DOS databases 
identified as the Dental Management Information System (DENMIS).  The productivity 
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data was sent to a centralized location monthly (BUMED) with the patient treatment data 
available only to the command from which it was generated.  Data being transmitted was 
not protected by encryption, thus anyone able to intercept it could view it.  Now, dental 
personnel are able to access DENCAS through their normal Internet connection and by 
utilizing their digital certificates to achieve a secure logon.  The digital certificates are 
used to identify the user who is then associated with user permissions stored in the 
database.  The user can then view patient information to which they have access for 
(identified by the UICs & CUICs).  
For the first time, corporate users at BUMED have a headquarters level view to 
Navy-wide patient treatment and productivity data.  This capability allows for immediate 
and accurate determination of U.S. Navy Dental readiness, something that once took over 
a month’s worth of data collection and processing from the dental commands to compute. 
Prior to DENCAS, all patient and productivity data was collected and stored at 
each individual dental command in the previous HRIS, DENMIS.  The distribution of 
data both upward to corporate users at BUMED and downward to customer command 
users required numerous paper printouts of data.  This collection and process of data was 
cumbersome, tedious and time consuming.  The result was usually inaccurate by the time 
it reached BUMED because dental readiness data can fluctuate from hour to hour. 
This system has been made useful for both the command level view and the 
headquarters level view for BUMED, which is not always an easy task.  At the command 
level view, the Dental Liaison’s are able to view their respective UICs & CUICs dental 
readiness and obtain a list of individuals who need a dental exam, or any other procedure 
for that matter.  Also, BUMED can view patient and productivity data either Navy-wide 
or scroll down to a specific command’s data.  This means that unit deployability and 
dental readiness information is now in a secure, central database and continuously 
available for real time analysis by operational brass.  This dental readiness review was 
not possible at a reasonable cost previously to DENCAS being implemented. 
DENCAS has relieved dental commands from the chore of generating the old and 
tedious monthly reports.  This means that the Hospital Corpsman (former Dental 
Technicians) previously assigned to clerical duties have now had time and paperwork 
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reduced, thus freeing them for other duties in the clinic.  This shift from clerical 
assignments to patient care has not only improved the quality of care, but has also 
enhanced the productivity of the staff.   
The above examples are how Navy Medicine leads the Navy in HRIS for 
decision-making.  As suggested by this discussion, a good HRIS is critical for success in 
any organization.  Moreover, there are at least three examples of why Navy Medicine is 
successful, effective and efficient. 
 
2. A-76 Process 
OMB Circular A-76 documents policies of the US Government for the 
“performance of commercial activities.”  It requires activities which government 
personnel perform to be classified as “commercial” or “inherently-governmental.”  All 
activities in the latter category are to be performed with government personnel (organic 
assets).  Activities in the former category are “subject to the forces of competition.”82  As 
outlined by Professor Franck in his BCA report,83 the competition process is summarized 
below: 
 
1. Inventory agencies activities, classify them as commercial or governmental,     
      and determine how the competition(s) are organized (“bundled”). 
2. Announce intention to undertake an outsourcing study, both to the affected    
government work force and to potential commercial sources. 
3. Develop and announce the terms of the competition to include expectations   
(Performance Work Statement, PWS), various study teams, and a quality 
assurance plan (QASP).  Criteria for source selection are also specified. 
4. Issue a solicitation, or Request for Proposal, seeking bids from the  
      commercial sector. 
 
 
                                                 
82 Raymond E. Franck, (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business Case 
Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View. 
83Ibid.  
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5. Develop the in-house alternative (Most Efficient Organization).  This consist  
of a management plan, cost estimate, performance plan, and transition plan.  
This alternative is one of the finalists. 
6. Compare the Most Efficient Organization (in-house) with the qualified  
commercial proposals (outsourced) generally in terms of cost of meeting the 
terms of the PWS.  (However, the contractor’s proposal must meet a minimum 
cost differential: 10 percent, or $10 million (whichever is less).) 
7. Award the contract (issuing agreement), after appeal if applicable. 
8. Transition to the in-house organization (if applicable) or to the winning 
commercial source. 
9. Conduct post-award contract administration (if applicable) and quality 
assurance.84 
The provisions of A-76 are not formulated with organic vs. contractor support of 
new systems in mind.  However, the essentials of the process provide useful benchmarks, 
regardless of the outsourcing decision at hand.  These essentials are listed below: 
 
1. Fully understand the context of the decision.  The performance of the activity 
in question affects capability (perhaps directly) and the performance of other 
organizations.  Performance categories and impacts of that performance 
should be carefully and specifically noted.  In the A-76 process, this is 
embodied in the PWS. 
2. Fully develop the relevant alternatives. 
3. Specify the consequences of selecting each of them.  In particular, A-76 
provides guidance for determining full costs of the alternatives. 
4. Assess the consequences.  The A-76 base case for comparison and assessment 
is cost of meeting the standards of the PWS. 
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5. Make a decision and implement it.  This phase includes awarding the contract 
or issuing an agreement.  It also includes any appeals, and actions associated 
with executing the PWS with the chosen provider.         
    
3. An Outsourcing Risk Assessment 
A former NPS student85 proposes a method for managers to assess the risks 
associated with a proposed outsourcing action in his thesis.  Basically, aspects of the new 
relationship are related with a stoplight scheme.  For example, if there is a high degree of 
asset specificity involved, there would be a red light in that category, and a higher degree 
of risk indicated.  Powell intended the light scheme to increase visibility of areas where 
management attention is important, and where managers ought to focus their risk-
reduction efforts.86  
That application is certainly valid, but there’s another wrinkle.  The study of 
Transactions Costs Economics indicates that risk-reduction measures (even if highly 
effective) are not risk-elimination panaceas.  Accordingly, one can expect an overall 
outsourcing action with a large number of assessed red and yellow lights will be more 
costly and risky during its execution, even with due diligence in risk reduction.87 
What follows is a variation of Powell’s stoplight scheme using the proposal of 
outsourcing Endodontists as an example of how the assessment would work. 
a. Asset Specificity. 
RED.  Source becomes specialized, with no close substitutes or 
competitors readily available.  Example: only qualified supplier for a 
specific, highly-specialized task. 
GREEN.  Routine (non-specialized) goods or tasks; competitors or 
close substitutes readily available.  Example: purchase of standard 
commercial items, such as paper clips and other office supplies. 
                                                 
85 Craig A. Powell, (2002). Transactions Cost Economics and A-76: A Framework for Defense 
Managers (Thesis). Retrieved 13 October 2005 from Naval Postgraduate School Library Web site: 
http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/publications/FY02/AM-02013.pdf  
86 Raymond E. Franck, Raymond C. (2004). Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series: Business 
Case Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support: A First-Principles View. 
87 Ibid. 
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Endodontics is a specialized field within the dental community.  However, 
competitors with close substitutes are readily available via civilian private practice.  
Therefore, asset specificity would be a green light. 
b. Complexity. 
RED.  A large-scale task covering a large geographic area.  
Complexity of task severely limits qualified bidders.  Example: large- 
scale, complex IT support; such as NMCI. 
 GREEN.  A simple, routine task or standard product.  A large  
number of qualified bidders.  Example: office supplies. 
The task of hiring civilian Endodontists would cover a large geographic area, but 
each contractor would be hired through specific Commands in separate Areas of 
Responsibility (AOR).  The geographic locations of MTFs throughout the Continental 
United States (CONUS) gives the Navy an advantage for hiring contractors because of 
the large number of qualified bidders (civilian Endodontists) that would be available in 
an area such as San Diego, California, for example.  The complexity of this proposed task 
would be a green light. 
c. Length of Relationship. 
RED.  A long-term relationship, which strains ability to foresee 
problems during original contract negotiations.  Complexity and asset  
specificity exacerbate this problem.  Example: IT support, such as NMCI. 
 GREEN.  Outsourcing is a one-time transaction, or can be  
structured as a series of one-time transactions.  Example: purchase of  
office supplies. 
One of the advantages to outsourcing is the flexibility of a contract.  The Navy 
can custom design each contract the way that they desire, as long as the contractor agrees 
to the contract itself of course.  However, a contract can be negotiated and doesn’t have 
to be long-term as described above.  Thereby, making the length of relationship a green 
light. 
d. Frequency. 
RED.  Specialized, complex task or service from which there is  
significant learning-by-doing.  Incumbent contractor has significant  
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competitive advantage over potential competitors.  Example: contract  
maintenance for specialized aircraft, such as E-4s. 
 GREEN.  Routine, standard task, service or product, in which a  
number of firms have significant expertise.  Example: copy machine  
repair. 
Granted, endodontics is not as routine as a copying machine.  There are a number 
of civilian Endodontists that would be available and interested in each billet that we 
wanted to fill throughout the MTFs located inside the CONUS.  Therefore, Endodontists 
under contract with the Navy would not require significant advantages over potential 
competitors.  Frequency would be considered a green light as well. 
e. Time Sensitivity. 
RED.  Quick performance of task or delivery of product is 
essential for satisfactory performance.  Example: repair of combat aircraft,  
or warship subsystems. 
 GREEN.  Quick delivery of products or accomplishment of task is  
not essential for satisfactory performance.  Satisfactory performance can  
include some delays.  Example: copy machine repairs. 
Of course, accomplishment of task is important.  However, the delivery of task for 
an Endodontist is not as time sensitive for satisfactory performance as demonstrated 
using the repair of combat aircraft above.  Each contractor would need to complete a 
number of tasks per month for each Commands dental readiness.  But, this particular 
contractor would be categorized as green, given the definitions above. 
f. Operational Significance. 
RED.  Unsatisfactory performance significantly degrades 
operational capability or compromises safety.  Example: repair of combat  







 GREEN.  Unsatisfactory performance involves, at most,  
administrative inconvenience and longer time to accomplish routine tasks.   
No compromise of operational readiness or safety.  Examples: delays in  
copy machine repairs and temporary lack of office supplies.88 
The operational significance of this particular task would be critical if a Sailor 
wasn’t treated for a root canal prior to deploying on a submarine.  However, the majority 
of the endodontic cases that you will see in the fleet for example give a command ample 
time to complete a root canal before a Sailor deploys.  Therefore, most cases for this 
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V. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA) MODEL AND RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The United States Navy Dental Corps is having difficulty recruiting dentists and 
retaining the junior and mid-grade Dental Corps Officers.  Despite aggressive efforts to 
improve Dental Corps recruitment and retention, the annual loss rate increased from 8.3% 
in 200389 to 12.9% for 2005.90  In addition, declining retention rates have negatively 
impacted applications for Graduate Dental Education (GDE) residency training programs, 
which have dropped 18% over the last five years.91  The Navy relies heavily on this 
group of officers to fill operational billets at sea, supporting the United States Marine 
Corps and Medical Treatment Facilities overseas. 
In addition to the accession programs already mentioned in Chapter II, the factors 
indicated above have forced the Dental Corps to use alternative programs such as the 
Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and the Financial Assistance Program 
(FAP)92.  The programs above cost the Navy over 10 million dollars a year, but necessary 
to attract dentists in the Navy.  As stated throughout this analysis, the Dental Corps 
should consider concentrating their resources on core military essential billets and 
contracting the workload for the non-essential billets, such as Endodontists. 
Section B of this chapter will discuss the literature review briefly: the 
methodology and criteria used for the analysis will be in Section C that will include 
alternatives chosen for this CBA; the current structure of costs for active duty and private 
practice Endodontists; potential cost avoidance if outsourcing is selected; the cost 
comparisons of each alternative; and concluding with findings and recommendations 
derived from this analysis. 
 
                                                 
89 Former Surgeon General of the Navy, “Defense Subcommittee Hearing on Medical Programs 
Testimony,” 2004, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220818/ [28 April 2004]. 
90 LCDR Kurt Houser, Medical Service Corps, United States Navy, Dental Corps Officer Community 
Manager, Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM).  Information given via email in January 2006.  
91 Former Surgeon General of the Navy, “Defense Subcommittee Hearing on Medical Programs 
Testimony,” 2004, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220818/ [28 April 2004]. 
92 LT Rodney Wilson, Dental Programs Coordinator, Naval Education and Training Command 
(NMETC). 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2001 directed the Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) to conduct a review specifically on the current adequacy of special 
pays and bonuses for health care officers in the Navy.  Two major studies followed: 
“Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Uniformed Health Professions” and “The Health 
Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study (Phases II & III: Adequacy of Special 
Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and selected other Health Care Professionals.”  
Both studies were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). 
Both of these studies show the current civilian – military pay gaps for dentists, but 
more specifically for dental specialists.  This particular CNA study93 found an existing 
$87,000 difference on average in pay for most specialists.  Because of this, the study also 
recommends increasing ASP by 20%, VSP by 25%, and DOMRB by 43%, as well as 
implementing higher accession bonuses and other recruiting incentives.94   
In addition, this particular study95 recommends a $15,000 increase of the current 
ASP.  Currently, the ASP is divided into three groups; < 3 years of service (YOS), > 3 
but < 10 YOS, and > 10 YOS.  If the recommended changes as proposed by the study are 
implemented, alternative one would look like this: 
• < 3 YOS – The current $4,000 would become 19,000 
• > 3 but < 10 YOS – The current $6,000 would become $21,000 
• > 10 YOS – The current $15,000 would become $30,000  
If the increases above were to be implemented, this would increase the cost 
savings for the Navy even more if the outsourcing option is utilized as shown in the 
comparison from the CBA that will be revealed further along in the Chapter. 
                                                 
93 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), The Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study 
(Phases II & III: Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and selected other Health 
Care Professionals), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2002), 113.   
94 Ibid, 145-156. 
95 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), The Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study 
(Phases II & III: Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and selected other Health 
Care Professionals), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2002), 113. 
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Thus far, Navy Medicine has converted 1,772 non-essential active duty billets to 
civilian or contract positions during FY0596; not all were dental specific however.  
Studies suggest that this conversion will affect 5,415 non-essential shore based billets as 
identified by The Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement (THCSRR). 
This shift in resource allocation or “transformation” initiated in 2001 by Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is designed to lead toward a more effective and efficient 
DoD.  Navy Medicine’s manpower and resource management experts have been working 
with representatives from the Medical, Dental, Medical Service, Nurse and Hospital 
Corps Chiefs/Director’s offices, and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to develop the 
economic analyses needed to support and inform a better human capital strategy.  In 
addition to the 1,772 military to civilian conversions in FY05, Navy Medicine 
successfully integrated Dental Treatment Facilities (DTFs) with the Medical Treatment 
Facilities (MTFs) and merged all Dental Technician’s with Hospital Corpsman into a 
single rate. 
These initiatives are very much in line with the Navy’s human resource 
philosophy, which includes maximizing civilian and contract personnel in non-essential 
positions.  The conversion of these positions will help alleviate the stress that has been 
put on the operating forces and ensure that military personnel are used to perform the 
tasks that are military essential.97  Furthermore, the PBD 712 also states that increased 
operational tempo of the U. S. forces and current fiscal constraints requires the DoD to 
take maximum use of its human resources and to ensure that military personnel are used 




                                                 
96 Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712, Military to Civilian Conversions, directed that a total of 
20,070 DoD-Wide military positions be converted to civilian positions between FY04 and FY05.  The 
Navy’s Defense Health Program was directed to convert a total of 1,772 military billets as part of the total 
20,070 conversion target 
97 Former Surgeon General of the Navy, “Defense Subcommittee Hearing on Medical Programs 
Testimony,” 2004, http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220818/ [28 April 2004]. 
98 Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712 (2003). Military to Civilian Conversions, Department of 
Defense, Washington, DC. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will now analyze whether the Dental Corps should continue to 
maintain the (base case) of recruiting general dentists for the purpose of retaining them 
beyond their initial obligation and train them in a postgraduate residency.  The alternative 
is to hire civilian contractors that are already trained, licensed and presently practicing 
within a given specialty, such as endodontics.  If Navy Medicine acts on the alternative 
proposal, it will not only be able to shrink the civilian-military pay gap for dentists, but 
also on the cost comparison differences of active duty and potential contractor pay that is 
proposed in this thesis.  So, which direction should they take? 
This analysis evaluated the differences in benefits and costs between the base case 
and the alternative.  It also conducted a thorough review of current structure costs for 
both active duty and contracting costs for private practice Endodontists.   
 
1. Alternatives   
This CBA compared two alternatives on the basis of benefit and cost.  The 
alternatives that were compared are as follows:   
 
• Alternative 1:  The Naval Dental Corps continues to recruit uniformed general 
dentists for the purpose of retaining them beyond initial obligation for training as 
Endodontists. 
• Alternative 2:  Hire civilian contract workers that are already trained, licensed and 
presently practicing as Endodontists. 
Alternative 1:  The Dental Corps recruits uniformed dentists through programs 
such as; the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP), the Health Services 
Collegiate Program (HSCP), the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program 
(AFHPSP), Direct Commission, Inter-Service Transfer and Recall to active duty.  
Currently, in addition to the above programs, the Navy has added the following 
incentives as well.  The Advanced General Dentistry Program (AGDP), the Financial 
Assistance Program (FAP), the Health Professions Loan Repayment Program and the 
accession bonus. 
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The Navy has also used the following direct monetary incentives to retain 
dentists: Additional Special Pay (ASP), Variable Special Pay (VSP), the Dental Officer 
Multiyear Retention Bonus (DOMRB), Board Certification Pay (BCP) and the one time 
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  Other incentives include General Dental 
Education opportunities in addition to health care and retirement benefits. 
Alternative 2:  Contract for civilian trained and licensed Endodontists to fill the 
non-essential shore-based endodontic billets.  Per the guidelines in the OPNAVINST 
1000.16J “Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures” and the PBD 
712, Navy Medicine has already begun doing this.  The OPNAV manual (p.3) states 
“Manpower Claimants shall identify manpower requirements as civilian unless justified 
as military essential.  Manpower Claimants shall rely on contractors to resource any new 
function not identified as military essential.” 
The methodology used in this project for comparing alternatives is generally 
consistent with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-94, which 
provides specific guidelines for CBAs.  According to the Circular, CBAs “should be 
performed to promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision-
making.”99  In particular, CBAs are part of the process for determining whether to 
outsource assets (as is proposed in this thesis).  The analysis should be explicit about 
underlying assumptions, their rationale, and an assessment of their strengths and 
weaknesses.  Key data and results should be transparent and promote independent 
analysis and review.  In addition, post implementation verification should be performed 
to determine whether anticipated benefits and costs have been realized and whether 
improvements are needed for future estimates of benefits and costs.      
Generally speaking, the foundation of a CBA is as follows: (a) the Return on 
Investment (ROI) = Net Present Value (NPV) of (Benefits – Costs), (b) Benefits = Dollar 
value of improved readiness, retention, recruiting, distribution, etc. resulting from the  
                                                 
99 Office of Budget and Management (OMB). (1992). Circular A-94: Guidelines and Discount Rates 
for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs. Retrieved 13 October 2005 from the OMB Web site: 
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policy or program in question over a stated horizon, and (c) Costs = Monetary (and dollar 
value of non-monetary) costs of implementing the policy or program over the same 
horizon. 
Estimating the program costs for the proposed policy of contracting Endodontists 
is straightforward.  The formula is [new pay/pay level] * [the number of Endodontists 
interested].  In this analysis, costs will consider unit costs for each contracted 
Endodontist.  This will be compared to the existing costs for each active duty Endodontist 
under the current pay structure.  The benefits for outsourcing are based on reducing costs 
of recruiting, training, transferring, providing retirement and retiree health benefits at a 
constant level of readiness.  Furthermore, using contractors in non-essential shore-based 
billets will allow the Dental Corps to utilize the active duty dentists in military essential 
billets per the guidelines of the OPNAV 1000.16J and the PBD 712.  
 
2. Current Pay Structure  
The basics of the current structure costs used in this analysis are as follows: (a) 
accession bonuses, (b) training, (c) stipends, salary and special pays, (d) benefits, (e) 
recruiting and moving, (f) temporary duty and (g) pension and retiree health care.     
 
a. Accession Bonus: The accession bonus is a one-time $30,000 entitlement used 
as a recruiting incentive.  To be eligible, the individual must execute a written agreement 
to accept a commission as an officer of the Dental Corps, be designated as a dental 
officer, and to serve on active duty for a period of not less than four years.100 
 
b. Training: Retention incentive offered to active duty dentists to attend a two 
year In-House or Out-Service postgraduate residency such as endodontics.  The estimated 
cost for an endodontic two year In-House postgraduate residency is $653,812.101 
 
                                                 
100 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures-
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington DC: 2002), 6.  
101 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Uniformed Health Professions 
(Phase I: Cost Model Methodology), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2003), 69.   
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c. Stipends, Salary and Special Pays: Additional pay offered to active duty 
dentists as retention incentives.  The estimated cost is $125,280 on average per dentist per 
year.102  
 
            d. Benefits: Various retention incentives offered to active duty dentists that were 
[structured] by this CNA study.  The estimated average cost is $17,712 per dentist per 
year.103 
 
            e. Recruiting and Moving: Initial costs for recruiting each active duty dentist plus 
additional moving costs for each PCS throughout one’s career.  The estimated costs are  
$61,145 one time recruiting cost per dentist and $4,169 for each PCS per dentist per year 
(Most dentists average a minimum of seven PCS moves in a 20 year career, totaling 
$29,183).104 
 
            f. Temporary Duty (TAD): Costs associated with miscellaneous collateral duties 
required by active duty dentists.  The estimated average cost is $2,250 per dentist per 
year.105 
 
            g. Pension and Retiree Health Care: The estimated average costs are $35,653 per 







                                                 
102 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Uniformed Health Professions 
(Phase I: Cost Model Methodology), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2003), Appendix D-13. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Uniformed Health Professions 
(Phase I: Cost Model Methodology), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2003), Appendix D-13. 
105 Ibid. 
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If Navy Medicine were to implement the proposed contractor alternative, major 
costs in the current structure could be avoided.  They are as follows: 
 
• Accession Bonus ($30,000 one time) 
• Two year In-House postgraduate residency ($653,812) 
• Stipends, Salary and Special Pay ($125,280) 
• Benefits ($17,712 per year) 
• Recruiting ($61,145 one time) 
• Moving ($4,169 for each PCS) 
• Pension and Retiree Health Care ($35,653 per year) 
Note: Costs are averaged per one active duty dentist and the income figures 
are trended to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.106   
The total savings is potentially $927,771 per billet filled by an endodontic 
contractor.  These benefits for outsourcing are based on reducing costs of recruiting, 
training, transferring active duty personnel, pension, retiree health care costs and other 
pays and benefits (due to a smaller active duty Corps of dentists and assuming a constant 
level of readiness).  The cost savings from the example above can then be applied toward 
the contractor’s salary and still save the Navy money on an annual basis.  This additional 
savings could be used for increasing the bonuses and special pays needed for retaining 
the military essential specialties as will be described further on in the Chapter. 
 
3. Findings 
This analysis used cumulative total costs over a 10-year period for a direct- 
accessed general dentist who was trained as an Endodontist while on active duty.  This 
means the costs accumulated from recruiting a direct accessed Lieutenant (O-3) up until 
the 10-year mark as a Lieutenant Commander (O-4).  The costs from the CNA study 
referenced107 do not include the two year In-House postgraduate residency, so this 
analysis will add that to the cumulative costs.  The cumulative total costs over the 10-year 
                                                 
106 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Uniformed Health Professions 
(Phase I: Cost Model Methodology), (Alexandria, Virginia: 2003), Appendix D-13. 
107 Ibid.   
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period are $1,391,211 and the two year postgraduate In-House residency costs are 
$653,812 totaling $2,045,023 per active duty Endodontist.  This averages to $204,502 
annually for a 10-year period.  The costs are referenced from the CNA study on 
Appendix D-13 for a direct accessed, comprehensively trained dentist with 10 years of 
service.  However, note that the costs referenced in the study are the same for dentists 
whether they were trained in orthodontics, comprehensive, endodontics or periodontics.   
In addition, costs are averaged per one active duty dentist and the income figures are 
trended to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  The study referenced used this 
process, so this study wanted to maintain the same continuity.  
This analysis also used salaries from the American Dental Association (ADA)108 
to compare active duty dentists to civilian counterparts as accurately as possible with the 
most recent, accurate and reliable data available.  The analysis averaged general dentist 
salaries for the first six years and then averaged the remaining four years for a specialty- 
trained dentist in private practice.  The ADA does not specifically use Endodontists or 
any other specialty, only “Specialists”.  This was in order to maintain continuity with the 
active duty dentist.  The general dentist salary used for the first six year period is 
$881,880 and the remaining four years as a specialist is $940,000 totaling $1,821,880.  
The averages for the contractor are $146,980 annually the first six years, and $235,000 
the remaining four years for the proposed 10-year period. The overall average salary for 
the 10-year period totals $182,188, which is a $223,143 savings in cost for the 10-year 
period favoring the contractor alternative.   
As referenced on Pg. 50 of Chapter IV, the A-76 guidelines state that a 
contractor’s proposal must meet a minimum cost differential in order for outsourcing to 
be considered cost effective: 10 percent, or $10 million (whichever is less).  In the case of 
outsourcing for Endodontists, the differential used would be 10 percent.  That said, the 
savings of $223,143 for the 10-year period of outsourcing for Endodontists is above the 
10 percent differential as required by the A-76 guidelines.   
 
 
                                                 
108 American Dental Association (ADA), The 2003 Survey of Dental Practice: Income from the 
Private Practice of Dentistry, (Chicago, Illinois: 2003), 13.  
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Table 6.   Cost Comparisons    
Cost Comparisons 









Total Costs = 
$2,045,023 
Average 






salary for first six 
years = $881,880 
Average annual 















A savings of  
$223,143 over 
the 10-year 
period to the 
Navy 
 
Note that the data taken from the ADA for general dentist salary was for five – 
nine years following graduation from dental school and the specialist salary used was for 
10 – 14 years following graduation.  This was necessary because the ADA states that 
surveys for the general dentist salaries for less than five years, and specialty salaries for 
less than 10 years was not possible due to volumes of unreliable responses.109 
Findings from the comparisons reveal a savings of $223,143 to the Navy over a 
10-year period if choosing to contract an already licensed and trained Endodontist, as 
long as the pay steps are increased in the manner composed within this analysis.  Also, if 
the ASP were to be increased by $15,000 as proposed by the CNA study earlier in the 
chapter on page 56, it could potentially be an additional savings of $427,143 over the 
same 10-year period if the contractor alternative is used.  This would be gained by adding 
$19,000 * 3 ($57,000) for < 3 YOS + $21,000 * 7 ($147,000) for > 3 but < 10 YOS to the 
initial savings of $223,143 per each active duty dentist not recruited.   
                                                 
109 American Dental Association (ADA), The 2003 Survey of Dental Practice: Income from the 
Private Practice of Dentistry, (Chicago, Illinois: 2003), 13.  
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In addition, this analysis has included a steady-state model to show a simplified personnel 
system for Dentists as shown in the table below. 
Table 7.   Simplified Personnel System for Dentists 
 
This is a simplified dentist personnel system representation, with active duty only.  For 
this discussion, we assume steady state flow; i.e., entries and exits into all boxes are equal 
for any given year. 
DISCUSSION:  GP_A is number of active duty dentists entering initial service.  At the 
end of the initial commitment (3 yrs), some dentists (GP_SEP, 38%) separate; some 
(GP_CAREER, 12%) elect to stay on active duty as GP dentists; some (SPEC_A, 50%) 
enter specialist training programs.  Following specialty training, some dentists 
(SPEC_SEP, 25%) separate; some remain for the rest of their careers as specialists 
(SPEC_CAREER, 75%).  Following an assumed 20 years of service as practitioners, all 

























With the percentages above, we can calculate relative proportions. 
 GP_SEP = .38*GP_A  
 GP_CAREER = .12*GP_A 
 SPEC_A = .50*GP_A 
 SPEC_SEP = .25*SEP_A = .125*GP_A 
 SPEC_CAREER = .75*SEP_A = .375*GP_A  
Also, this analysis included the same steady-state model shown above with contract 
dentists added revealed below. 
Table 8.   Personnel System with Contractors 
 
This is a representation of the same system with contract dentists added.  Assume the 
contracted dentists have three-year terms of employment. 
CONSEQUENCES with assumed flow are as follows.  Services: Each accessed dentist 
(GP_A) results in 5.04 years of GP service on average.  (.50*3+.38*3+.12*20).  Each 
accessed dentist also provides an average of 6.00 years of specialty service 



























(.50*.25*3+.50*.75*15).  Using average service provided, we can reduce GP_A by one if 
we hire 1.68 GP contractors and 2.00 specialist contractors.  
Costs and Services by Category: 
GP_SEP = 3 years of junior officer bonuses, salary and special pays (3 yrs GP 
service) 
GP_CAREER = 20 years of bonuses, salary, and special pays plus retirement (20 
yrs GP service) 
SPEC_SEP = 8 years of bonuses, salary, and special pays plus 2 years of specialty 
training (3 yrs GP, 3 yrs Spec) 
SPEC_CAREER = 20 years of bonuses, salary, and special pays plus retirement 
(3 yrs GP, 2 yrs training, 15 yrs Spec) 
CONT_GP = 3 years of GP dentists salary (3 yrs GP service) 
CONT_SPEC = 3 years of dental specialist salary) 3 yrs SPEC service) 
Table 9.   Costs and Services by Category 
 
COSTS & SERVICES BY CATEGORY
• GP_SEP Î 3 years of junior officer salary (3 yrs GP service) = $613,506
• GP_CAREER Î 20 years of salary, plus retirement. (20 yrs GP service) = $4,516,234
• SPEC_SEPÎ 8 years of salary, 2 years of specialty training (3yrs GP, 3yrs Spec) = 
$1,636,016
• SPEC_CAREER Î 20 years of salary (3yrs GP, 15 yrs Spec) = $5,170,046
• CONT_GP Î 3 yrs GP dentist salary (3 yrs GP service) = $440,940
• CONT_SPEC Î 3 yrs SPEC dentist salary (3 yrs SPEC service) = $705,000
• Using the data above, our average costs for an active duty dentist = $2,983,951 vs. 
$756,000 for 5.04 yrs GP dentist salary and $1,410,000 for 6.0 yrs SPEC dentist salary
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Note that the figures used with the Cost Benefit Analysis earlier in the chapter were used 
in this model as well.  GP_CAREER & SPEC_CAREER include in the calculation a 
conservative estimate of 30 years retirement pay in addition to the 20 years of salary.  We 
can then average costs for an accessed active duty dentist vs. the contractor equivalent 
using the figures above.  This results in $2,983,951 for an active duty dentist and 
$2,166,000 for a contracted dentist, a savings of $817,951 or about 27%.  Furthermore, 
note that contractor pay can be adjusted within a given fiscal year by the command 
comptroller, unlike government service (GS) counterparts in the same billet.  This option 
is also a very convenient method for awarding bonuses, pay raises, and so forth. 
Listed below are the immediate benefits resulting if the proposal is implemented: 
- $927,771 cost savings per active duty dentist not recruited 
-  Assist [in justifying to Navy Medicine] the conversion of a portion of the 
remaining 3,600 or so active duty billets to civilian or contract as 
mandated by the PBD 712 
-  Improved readiness and retention for Medical Treatment Facilities 
-  Close the gap on the civilian-military difference in pay for the needed 
active duty essential dental specialty billets by increasing the bonuses and specialty pays 
from the cost savings indicated.  Thereby, decreasing the loss rate and increasing 
retention for both the essential and non-essential billets. 
 
4. Recommendations  
This analysis recommends using the funds saved from recruiting less uniformed 
general dentists as indicated in the Findings Section above on: 
- Retaining the necessary military essential uniformed dentists the Navy 
needs on active duty by increasing the bonuses and specialty pays as 
recommended by the CNA studies referenced previously in the chapter 
- Contract civilian Endodontists for non-essential billets at all CONUS 
shore-based Medical Treatment Facilities 
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If Navy Medicine follows the guidelines as set forth in the OPNAVINST 1000.16J and 
the PBD 712, and retains the required amount of uniformed dentists as directed by the 
Mission, Functions, and Tasks Statement, the following should occur: 
- The Return on Investment (ROI) from the policy proposal combined 
with the recommended pay structure changes would be cost-effective as 
presented in the Findings Section  
- The benefits from contracting are based on reducing costs of recruiting,     
training, transferring active duty personnel, pension and retiree health 
care costs (due to a smaller active duty Corps of dentists and assuming a 
constant level of readiness).  The cost savings from avoiding the benefits 
above can then be applied toward the contractor’s salary and still save 
the Navy money on an annual basis.  This additional savings could be 
used for increasing the bonuses and special pays needed for retaining the 
military essential specialties 
- Based from the results, it appears that the higher the number of non-
essential shore-based billets filled by contractors, the higher the savings 
- Recommend evaluating one year following the implementation of this 














































VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The total amount of special pay received by Navy dentists has remained 
essentially unchanged since Fiscal Year 1980.  As a result, the total pay of Dental Corps 
paygrades has increased at a slower rate than the cost of living.  This has caused the 
annual loss rate to increase as well as to contribute to a significant drop in the graduate 
dental education residencies.  The Navy relies heavily on this group of officers to fill the 
operational billets at sea, in addition to supporting the United States Marine Corps and 
Medical Treatment Facilities overseas. 
Several studies have shown that the current pay for dentists is not attractive 
enough to recruit or retain the amount of dentists that the Navy will need as stated in the 
Mission, Functions, and Tasks Statement.  These results indicate increasing bonuses and 
specialty pay for the active duty military essential billets.  Increasing the size of the 
bonuses and specialty pays can help the Navy meet operational requirements and save 
money at the same time.  The Navy could then adjust the bonuses and pays to meet the 
requirement needed, thus providing an additional force-shaping tool.  The Navy could 
then recruit the dentists needed for military essential billets and use the saved money for 
contracting the non-essential shore-based specialties, such as endodontics (as proposed in 
this analysis).   
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
 Based on the findings from this analysis, the following Dental Corps policy 
recommendations are suggested: 
Referenced studies used throughout this analysis suggest exploring the feasibility of 
recruiting already-licensed dentists to meet the mission of the Navy.  Additionally, the 
same studies show low retention of general dentists remaining past their initial service 
obligation commitment.  This suggests that retention might be improved for the military 
essential billets by expanding efforts to recruit currently-licensed and more mature  
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dentists with subspecialties.  Pursuing currently-licensed dentists with subspecialties as 
contractors for our non-essential billets, such as Endodontists seems feasible, and cost-
effective. 
 Additionally, contracting should be used as a complement to uniformed dentists.  
The intent would not be an attempt to “replace” the uniformed dentists.  The (base case) 
here is recruiting general dentists for the purpose of retaining them beyond their initial 
obligation to train them in a postgraduate residency.  The alternative proposed is to hire 
civilian contractors that are already trained, licensed and practicing within a given 
specialty, such as endodontics.  The findings indicate using some combination of both.  
In order to mitigate shortages, the Navy should allocate resources to retain military 
essential uniformed dentists by increasing the bonuses and special pays (as recommended 
by the studies referenced previously).  Contracted civilian endodontists for non-essential 
billets at shore-based Military Treatment Facilities could at the minimum help fill 
remaining personnel gaps. 
 
C. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 The following are potential areas for future research recommendations: 
1. Extend this analysis to other non-essential shore-based specialties.  
Based on the results of this analysis, it appears there are potential 
savings in outsourcing other specialties. 
2. Expand this study and take a more systemic view of the dental career 
field and the dental services that are provided in the Navy.  Are 
services such as Public Health Dentistry for example still necessary and 
if so, do we need an active duty dentist to perform the requirement? 
3. Based on the concerns relating to manning shortages at the junior and 
mid-grade levels, an extensive retention survey would be recommended 
to identify factors in predicting officer retention characteristics.  A 
good reference for this would be the Navy Nurse Manpower 
Management Model by the Defense Resources Management Institute.       
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